Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age by Yu, Peter K.
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
1-2002 
Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age 
Peter K. Yu 
peter_yu@msn.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Internet Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 1 
(2002). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/477 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
BRIDGING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE:
EQUALITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
PETER K. Yu*
People lack many things: jobs, shelter, food, health care and
drinkable water. Today, being cut off from basic telecommuni-
cations services is a hardship almost as acute as these other dep-
rivations, and may indeed reduce the chances of finding
remedies to them.
-Kofi Anan, Secretary General,
United Nations'
There is no reason why hundreds of millions of people living in
Central Asia, Latin America or Africa should be cut off from the
ideas changing the rest of the world-or why these ideas should
not be enriched by their local experience-simply because of a
lack of readily available cable or satellite technology. The capac-
ity of the Internet-yet to be fully imagined-to eliminate for-
ever the knowledge gap between rich and poor countries may
be the single most important determinant of what our world will
look like in fifty years. Whether it be linking rural villages in
India with one another, health clinics in Kazakhstan to hospitals
in Paris, or farmers in Ukraine to commodity markets in Chi-
cago, we have the power to accelerate development by
generations.
-James D. Wolfensohn, President,
The World Bank Group
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* Acting Assistant Professor of Law, Executive Director, Intellectual Property Law Pro-
gram & Deputy Director, Howard M. Squadron Program in Law, Media & Society, Benja-
min N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; Research Associate, Programme in
Comparative Media Law & Policy, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford.
The Author would like to thank members of the Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal
and the Communications Law Society, in particular Kimathi Foster and Sarah Warren, for
assistance in organizing the Second Squadron Symposium on Internet, Law & Society,
which was held at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University on Novem-
ber 15, 2000. This Article benefits from the insights of the participants of the Symposium
and contributors to this Symposium Issue, including Andrew Celli, Tracy Cohen, Mark
Cooper, Kenneth Dreifach, B. Keith Fulton, Allen Hammond, Mary Keelan,Jack Qiu, and
Stefaan Verhulst. The Author also would like to thank Douglas Isenberg, the editor and
publisher of GigaLaw.com, for providing a forum for exploring some of the ideas con-
tained in this Article. This Symposium Issue is dedicated to the memory of the late How-
ard M. Squadron (1926-2001), whose generosity and commitment to legal education had
made the Squadron Program possible.
1 PIPPA NORRIS, DIGITAL DIVIDE: Civic ENGAGEMENT, INFORMATION POVERTY, AND THE
INTERNET WORLDWIDE 40 (2001).
2 Press Release, James D. Wolfensohn, President, World Bank Group, A Call to Global
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Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights pro-
vides: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference or to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers."3 However, not eve-
rybody has the ability to seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas through the Internet and new communications technologies.
Likewise, not everybody has the privilege to fully participate in the
information revolution and the New Economy.
The digital revolution has transformed the lives of many, but
also has left untouched the lives of many others. As a result, a large
segment of the world population misses out on the tremendous
political, social, economic, educational, and career opportunities
created by the digital revolution. This gap between the informa-
tion haves and have-nots is commonly referred to as the digital di-
vide. Since the mid-1990s, the digital divide has received
considerable attention in international forums,4 in presidential de-
bates,' and among corporate leaders.6
Action in a Global Economy (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.worldbank.org.ba/news/
2000/pr-apr0-01 .htm.
' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 19
(1948).
4 See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, World Bank Unit to Join in Internet Start-up Finance, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2000, at C6 (reporting that the World Bank's International Finance Corporation
has teamed up with Softbank of Japan to create a fund that will finance Internet start-ups
in one hundred less developed countries); Calvin Sims, Group of 8 Pledges to Help Poor Coun-
tries, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2000, at A6 (reporting that the C-8 countries "agreed to establish a
task force to help developing countries reap the benefits offered by new information tech-
nologies"). One journalist described the reaction of the international community:
Since Aug. 1 [, 2000], the United Nations has sent 37 high-tech volunteers to
countries like Benin, Botswana and Ecuador. The State Department's version,
called the Global Technology Corps, began in late 1998 and has sponsored
more than 20 projects in Kosovo, Nigeria, Poland and other far-flung locales.
Still another project, Net Crops America, focuses only on Latin America and
the Caribbean. And in August the Peace Corps began to include information
technology among its specialties, sending 10 volunteers to Belize.
Shaila Dewan, Geeks, Proud of the Name, Start a Volunteer Crops, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2000, at
G7.
5 For discussions of the different positions concerning education technology taken by
Vice President Al Gore and then-Governor George Bush in the 2000 presidential election,
see Andy Carvin, Edtech and the Presidential Race, Part 1: George W. Bush's Edtech Proposals,
DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/in-
dex.cfm?key=16 (last visited Dec. 30, 2001); Andy Carvin, Edtech and the Presidential Race,
Part 2: Al Gore's Edtech Proposals, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://
www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/index.cfm?key=18 (last visited Dec. 30,
2001); Katharina Kopp, Searching for the Difference-Gore v. Bush on High Tech Policy, DIGITAL
DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/-index.cfm?
key=17 (last visited Dec. 30, 2001); Kevin Taglang, Politics and the Digital Divide, Part 1: Vice
President Gore and the Democrats, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenet-
work.org/content/stories/index.cfm?key=33 (last visited Dec. 30, 2001).
6 See, e.g., John Markoff, High-Tech Executives Urge Action on World's Digital Divide, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2000, at A6 (reporting that a group of high-tech executives urged the
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During the Clinton Administration, the Department of Com-
merce conducted four detailed surveys on the digital divide in the
United States.7 The final report, which was released shortly before
the end of the Administration, showed an increasing number of
Americans using computers and the Internet.' Between December
1998 and August 2000, the share of households with Internet ac-
cess rose from 26.2% to 41.5%, while the share of individuals with
Internet access rose from 32.7% to 44.4%."' By the end of the sur-
vey in August 2000, more than half of all American households
have computers, 1 and 116.5 million Americans have Internet ac-
cess at some locations.'
2
The report also found a rapid increase in Internet access
"among most groups of Americans, regardless of income, educa-
tion, race or ethnicity, location, age, or gender."' 3 For example,
the gap in Internet access between households in rural areas and
households nationwide has narrowed,14 and the disparity in In-
wealthiest nations to help bridge the growing global digital divide); Michel Marriott, Money
Is Pledged to Close Digital Divide on Campuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2000, at G3 (reporting that
Microsoft, IBM, and AT&T pledged more than $101 million worth of materials, software,
services, training, and financial support for a United Negro College Fund program that
aims to improve computer access for students and faculty at historically black colleges and
universities).
7 In chronological order, these four surveys are: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING
THROUGH THE NET: A SURVEY OF THE "HAVE NOTS" IN RURAL AND URBAN AMERICA (1995)
[hereinafter FALLING THROUGH THE NET I], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/-fallingthru.html; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH TIHE NET: NEW
DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE (1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/net2/
; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH T[-HE NET: DEFINING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
(1999) [hereinafter FALLING THROUGH THE NET Ill], available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/fttn99/-FTTN.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FALLING THROUGH THE NET: To-
WARD DIGITAL INCLUSION (2000) [hereinafter FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV], available at
http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf.
8 See FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 7 (documenting an increasing level of
digital inclusion in the United States).
9 Id. at 1.
10 Id. at 33.
iI Id. at 1. 51% of American households have computers, and more than 80% of these
households have Internet access. See id.
12 Id. at 33. These locations include, among others, homes, friends' homes, schools,
workplaces, libraries, community centers, and cyber cafes. See Brooke Bascom, Libraries Are
Connecting Millions to the Internet, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenet-
work.org/content/stories/-index.cfm?key=]18 (last visited Dec. 30, 2001) (noting that li-
braries have emerged "as one of the most important vehicles for bridging the Digital
Divide as they increase the availability of technology to patrons and elevate the technical
expertise of staff"); see aLso Mark J. Maier, Affordable Internet Access for All Americans, 6 RICii.
J.L. & TECH. 8, 1 74-80 (1999), at http://www.richmond.edu/JOLT/-v6i2/article3.html
(arguing that the government should provide Internet access in public libraries across the
country).
13 FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 7, at xv.
14 See id. at 5. The gap in Internet access between households in rural areas and house-
holds nationwide has narrowed from a 4.0 percentage point difference in 1998 to a 2.6
percentage point difference in 2000. See id.
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ternet usage between men and women has largely disappeared.'"
Americans at the middle-income levels are connecting at far higher
rates from their homes.'" And Internet access is expanding across
every education level, particularly for those with some high school
or college education.' 7 Blacks and Hispanics still lag behind other
ethnic or racial groups; yet, they have shown impressive gains in
Internet access.'" Although individuals older than fifty are still less
likely than younger Americans to use the Internet, this age group
has experienced the highest rates of growth in Internet usage com-
pared to all other age groups. ' In sum, groups that have tradition-
ally been the information have-nots have made dramatic gains in
Internet access within the last few years.
Although the report showed that the digital divide in the
United States is closing,20 the same is not true for the less devel-
oped countries. To date, the developed countries account for
more than eighty percent of the world market for information
technology, 21 while Internet penetration is very limited in sub-
Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia.22
There are 510.5 computers per 1000 people in the United States,
but only 3.2 per 1000 people in South Asia and 8.4 per 1000 people
in sub-Saharan Africa.23 Of the estimated 332 million people who
use the Internet, less than 1 percent lives in Africa.24 In fact, some
less developed countries do not even have basic telecommunica-
tions infrastructure or a reliable supply of electricity.25 Although
15 See id. at 33. In December 1998, 34.2% of men and 31.4% of women used the In-
ternet. See id. By August 2000, "Internet use rates in the aggregate were virtually identical
for men (44.6%) and women (44.2%)." Id.
17 See id. at 8-9. Internet access among households with incomes between $35,000 and
$49,000 rose from 29.0% in December 1998 to 46.1% in August 2000. See id.
17 See id. at 10-11. Of all education levels, households headed by someone with "some
college experience" showed the greatest expansion in Internet penetration, rising from
30.2% in December 1998 to 49.0% in August 2000. See id.
18 See id. at 13. Between December 1998 and August 2000, Internet access for Black and
Hispanic households doubled from 11.2% to 23.5% and from 12.6% to 23.6%, respec-
tively. See id.
',9 See id. at 33. The 50+ age group "saw faster growth in Internet use than the country
as a whole, with Internet use growing at a rate of 53% compared to 36% for the country as
a whole." Id. Individuals in this age group "were almost three times as likely to be Internet
users if they were in the labor force." Id,
21 See id. at 2 (suggesting that the digital divide in the United States "has begun to
narrow and will do so soon").
21 See NORRIS, supra note 1, at 41.
22 Id. at 233.
23 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2001, at 308 (2001), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2OO1/pdfs/tab5_ 10.pdf.
24 Marc Lacey, Clinton Hurries to Return to Camp David, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, § 1, at
10.
25 A similar lack of information infrastructure exists in many Indian communities in
the United States.
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the developed world has about 50 phone lines per 100 people, the
less developed countries have only 1.4 phone lines per 100 people.
In light of the alarming disparities between the information
haves and have-nots, the Howard M. Squadron Program in Law,
Media and Society at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
Yeshiva University selected the digital divide as the topic for its Sec-
ond Squadron Symposium on Internet, Law & Society. Included in
this symposium issue are five articles and an issue brief.
Andrew Celli and Kenneth Dreifach point out that the digital
divide is a multifaceted problem representing a "convergence of
several fault lines."2 6 In addition to the access divide, which has
captured both national and international attention, Celli and
Dreifach discuss two additional divides. The capital divide reflects
the inequalities in raising start-up money for business ventures on
the Internet,27 while the treatment divide discriminates consumers
based on their Internet browsing habits and purchasing
preferences.
28
Mark Cooper explains how the Internet and new communica-
tions technologies have created and widened the gap between the
information haves and have-nots. 29 Exploring the social implica-
tions of the digital divide, Cooper explains why this technological
gap deserves all the public policy attention it has been receiving.
30
Professor Allen Hammond explores the various aspects of the
digital divide and discusses the balance between competition and
safeguards struck by existing telecommunications law. 3  Focusing
on the current economic downturn in the high-tech industry, Pro-
fessor Hammond cautions that this downturn "may serve as the oc-
casion and motivation for defining the digital divide and reducing
Only 47 percent of the nation's 720,000 Indian households have plain old tele-
phone service, compared with a nationwide rate of 94 percent, according to the
F.C.C. And on some tribal lands, phone service is even rarer. On the Navajo
Reservation, the nation's largest Indian territory, encompassing parts of New
Mexico, Arizona and Utah, only about one in five households have telephones.
Simon Romeo, Tribes Seeking Phone Systems as Steps to Web, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at Al; see
also Marc Lacey, Clinton Hopes to Raise Indian Internet Use, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2000, at A23
(reporting President's Clinton $17-million initiative that offers $1-a-month phone service
to up to 300,000 Indians nationwide).
26 Andrew Celli & Kenneth Dreifach, Postcards from the Edge: Surveying the Digital Divide,
20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 54 (2002).
27 See id. at 62 (discussing the capital divide). Andrew Celli and Kenneth Dreifach ar-
gue that the capital divide "held back Internet opportunities conceived and/or oriented
toward racial and ethnic minorities." Id. at 64-65.
28 See id. (discussing the treatment divide).
29 See Mark N. Cooper, Inequality in the Digital Society: Why the Digital Divide Deserves All the
Attention It Gets, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 73 (2002).
3o See id.
31 See Allen S. Hammond, The Digital Divide in the New Millennium, 20 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 135 (2002) [hereinafter Hammond, Digital Divide].
6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
targeted subsidies. '3 2 He concludes by providing recommenda-
tions on how we could avoid this unfortunate outcome.
Jack Qiu shifts the focus from the United States to China. Qiu
argues that the catchphrase "digital divide" is elusive in describing
information inequalities in this vast and complex country.3 4 In lieu
of this popular phrase, he proposes to use the concept of "informa-
tion stratification," which, he argues, would better fit local Chinese
conditions.
35
At the end of the symposium is an issue brief by B. Keith
Fulton, one of the most recognized authorities on digital divide
issues in the United States.36 Detailing AOL Time Warner Founda-
tion's portfolio of digital opportunity programs, this document
provides insights into how the private sector plans and uses its re-
sources to extend benefits of the information age. 7
As an introduction to this symposium issue, this Article high-
lights the global significance of the digital divide. Part I discusses
five key prerequisites for bridging this inequitable gap: awareness,
access, affordability, availability, and adaptability. Part 1I focuses
on the inequalities in Internet access between the developed and
less developed countries. This Part explains why including the less
developed countries in the digital revolution would benefit the de-
veloped countries as well as the less developed countries. Part III
highlights the various areas that may present challenges for poli-
cies seeking to bridge the digital divide.
I. Two D's AND FIVE A's38
Although the origin of the term digital divide remains un-
known,39 the term "has entered everyday speech as shorthand for
32 Id. at 140.
3 See id. at 153.
S4 See Jack Linchuan Qiu, Coming to Terms with Information Stratification in the People's
Republic of China, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157 (2002).
35 Id. at 158.
316 See B. Keith Fulton, AOL Time Warner Foundation: Extending Internet Benefits to All 20
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181 (2002).
37 See id.
38 The "Two D's and Five A's" formula was inspired by the speech of Dr. Ahmad Nazif,
Egypt's Minister of Communications and Information Technology, at a breakfast meeting
held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. At that
occasion, Dr. Nazif noted the need to "transform the two Ds to three As," with the two Ds
being the digital divide, and the three As being awareness, access, and affordability. See
Mugo Macharia, The Global Digital Divide: An Egyptian Perspective, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK,
at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/-stories/index.cfm?key=32 (last visited
Dec. 30, 2001).
'9 A Lexis-Nexis search traced the term back to DINTY W. MOORE, THE EMPEROR'S VIR-
TUAL CLOTHES: THE NAKED TRUrIi- ABOUT INTERNET CULTURE (1995). See Cyber-Santas
Should Heed Computer-buying Tips from Staff and Wire RPports, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 19,
[Vol. 20:1
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any and every disparity within the online community."4 ° Covering
a large range of communications technologies4 and "multiple lay-
ers" of access to and use of these technologies,42 the digital divide
represents a multifaceted problem4" that encompasses a wide spec-
trum of disparities and differences based on race, gender, age, in-
come, education, type of household, geographic location, physical
abilities, and the level of economic development. As commenta-
tors cautioned, the term is so broad and ambiguous that it can be
used by the left to support demands for universal service, broad-
band technologies, and philanthropy while at the same time by the
1995, at 8F. For an interesting discussion of the term's origin collected from Benton Foun-
dation's Digital Divide Listserv, see http://www.rtpnet.org/lists/rtpnet-tact/
msg00080.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2001). Donna Hoffman and others attributed the
term to Lloyd Morrisett, the former president of the Markle Foundation. See Donna L.
Hoffman et al., The Evolution of the Digital Divide: How Gaps in Internet Access May Impact
Electronic Commerce, J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM. (March 2000), at http://www.ascusc.org/
jcmc/vol5/issue3/hoffman.html. Yet, Morrisett expressed his skepticism about his coin-
age: "I am not at all certain that is true. My best guess is that someone else did it." Benja-
min M. Compaine, Preface [hereinafter Compaine, Preface] to THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: FACING A
CRISIS OR CREATING A MYrH? xiv (Benjamin M. Compaine ed., 2001) [hereinafter DIGITAL
DIVIDE SOURCEBOOK].
40 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 3-4; Dean Colby, Conceptualizing the "Digital Divide:" Closing the
"Gap" by Creating a Postmodern Network That Distributes the Productive Power of Speech, 6 COMM.
L. & POL'v 123, 123-24 (2001) (arguing that the digital divide "is the usefully alliterative
slogan whose panpolitical ambiguity lends rhetorical capital to whomever [sic] chooses it").
41 These technologies include, among others, telephones, personal computers, the In-
ternet, broadband services, mobile phones, satellite communications, and other wireless
technologies.
42 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 92; see also Milton Mueller, Telecommunications Access in the Age
of Electronic Commerce: Toward a Third-Generation Universal Service Policy, 49 FED. COMM. L.J.
655, 659 (1997); Qiu, supra note 34, at 162. As Pippa Norris pointed out:
[L]evels of Internet access can vary substantially. Today people living in poorer
neighborhoods may be able to surf the Web from public libraries, schools, and
community centers, or even cyber cafes, but this is not the same as having auto-
matic access via high-speed connections at home and the office. Nor is it the
same as having all Internet, all the time, downloadable via personal appliances,
digital assistants, and cellular phones for today's wired road warriors in planes,
ships, and trains.
NORRIS, supra note 1, at 92. A survey conducted by the Los Altos-based Access Worldwide
Cultural Access Group found that both African Americans and Latinos "were less likely
than the general population to seek financial or technological information online." Lee
Romney, Minorities Use the Web Differently, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2001, at C2. While "African
Americans were more likely than other groups to focus on career advancement and profes-
sional development, education, family and relationships and entertainment .... Latinos...
were more likely to use the Internet as a major source of news content, particularly for
international news." Id.
43 See, e.g., Celli & Dreifach, supra note 26, at 54 (noting that "the digital divide is not a
single chasm, but the convergence of several fault lines"). Pippa Norris argued that the
digital divide is "a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing three distinct aspects."
The global divide refers to the divergence of Internet access between industrial-
ized and developing societies. The social divide concerns the gap between infor-
mation rich and poor in each nation. And finally within the online community,
the democratic divide signifies the difference between those who do, and do not,
use the panoply of digital resources to engage, mobilize, and participate in
public life.
NORRIS, supra note 1, at 4.
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right to promote further liberalization and commercialization of
communications networks.44 To help people systematically analyze
this technological gap, this Part discusses five key prerequisites for
bridging the digital divide.
A. Awareness
It goes without saying that those who are not aware of the In-
ternet and new communications technologies will not be able to
benefit from the myriad opportunities created by the information
revolution. Likewise, those who are not aware of the benefits of
computers and online access will not be able to take advantage of
the valuable digital opportunities.45 This lack of awareness is par-
ticularly acute among the poor, in rural areas, and in the less devel-
oped countries. Among the entire world population, only ten
percent have access to the Internet, and an additional twenty per-
cent have heard about the Internet.46 If the other seventy percent
of the population were to be included in the digital economy,
these people must become aware of the changing technological
environment.
B. Access
Access to the Internet and new communications technologies
is paramount to survival in the New Economy. Today, information
technology increasingly determines the ease with which we con-
duct such daily activities as personal communication, business
transactions, entertainment, education, job searches, research and
information gathering, medical assistance, and political participa-
tion.47 They also enable us to "connect[ ] to family, friends,
44 See Colby, supra note 40, at 125-26; it. at 131 (criticizing the current digital divide
policies for choosing the solution "in order to determine the possible problems"); see also
Hammond, DigitalDivide, supra note 31, at 135 ("Because each definer proffers a definition
based on his or her perspective and may selectively emphasize particular statistical evi-
dence, the definitions can seem conflicting and incongruous, potentially leading to confu-
sion."); Testimony on Telecommunications and the Internet:Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 54 (2001) [hereinafter Chairman Powell's Testimony]
(statement of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission) (not-
ing that the term is "extraordinarily broad and involves everything from notions of social
justice to gaps in computer deployment to infrastructure to educational curriculum").
45 Among those American households that have never had an Internet connection,
close to a third of them stated "don't want it" as the reason for not accessing the Internet at
home. FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 7, at 26. Other leading reasons included
"cost, too expensive" (17.3%), "can use elsewhere" (10.4%), "not enough time" (9.1%),
and "computer not capable" (6.7%). Id.
46 Macharia, supra note 38.
47 See Allen S. Hammond, IV, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Codifying the Digital
Divide, 50 FED. COMM. LJ. 179, 182 (1997) [Hammond, Telecommunications Act] (noting
that "[a]ccess to [telecommunications] networks increasingly determines the ease with
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schools, employers, political representatives, markets and soci-
ety."48 Without information technology, we will become the "New
Invisible Man."49 Our function as citizens, students, workers, and
consumers in society also will diminish significantly.50
At the global level, computers and Internet access become
even more important. As "the new basis for wealth,"5 information
technology will enable countries to acquire strengths that are lack-
ing in countries that fail to participate in the digital economy. The
information revolution also might allow the less developed coun-
tries to catch up with the developed countries by leapfrogging
stages of technological, industrial, and infrastructural develop-
ment.52 To take advantage of these enormous benefits, the Clinton
which we can conduct and control financial affairs; pursue an education; acquire the skills
to become employable; call for emergency police, fire, or medical assistance; apply for a
job; work at a distance; or participate in the political process"); Maier, supra note 12, 37
(noting that the Internet and new communications technologies "will permeate many as-
pects of life, including social interaction, cognitive skills, leisure activities, employment,
and family life").
48 Hammond, Telecommunications Act, supra note 47, at 182; see alsoJerry Kang, Cyber-race,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1206 (2000) ("Cyberspace creates novel communication platforms
that open up new possibilities in both individual identity and social interaction. By design-
ing cyberspace appropriately, we may be able to alter American racial mechanics.").
49 Scott Louie, The New Invisible Man, Yo! YOUTH OUTLOOK, available at http://
www.youthoutlook.org/stories/1999/11/01/the.new.invisib.html (Nov. 1, 1999) (describ-
ing the author's experience as "the new millennium's Invisible Man" after he unplugged
his modem for a few days); see also Hammond, Telecommunications Act, supra note 47, at 185
("As the networks and the equipment attached to them become the preferred mode of
political participation, lifelong learning, employment and commerce, as well as personal
expression, nonaccess and nonconnection could become tantamount to 'nonexistence.'").
50 See Hammond, Telecommunications Act, supra note 47, at 184; see also id. at 185 (argu-
ing that the information superhighway is the nation's "nervous system," the breakdown of
which would jeopardize essential body parts and functions); Press Release, 3Com, 3Com
CEO Eric Benhamou Provides Keynote Address on Digital Divide for Commonwealth Club
of Silicon Valley, available at http://www.3com.com/corpinfo/enUS/pressbox/
press.release.jsp?INFOID=2001868 (July 19, 2000) ("[Information technology] access
and [information technology] skills are no longer an option but an essential requirement
for functioning in modern society and becoming a full participant in the new economy.
We should think of it the same fundamental way as two centuries ago, when people
thought of the skills of reading, writing, and counting."), quoted in William E. Kennard &
Elizabeth Evans Lyle, With Freedom Comes Responsibility: Ensuring That the Next Generation of
Technologies Is Accessible, Usable and Affordable, 10 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 5, 7 (2001).
51 LESTER C. THUROW, BUILDING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR THE INDIVIDUALS, COMPA-
NIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY xiii (1999) ("Knowledge is the new
basis for wealth .... In the past, when capitalists talked about their wealth, they were
talking about their ownership of plant and equipment or natural resources. In the future
when capitalists talk about their wealth, they will be talking about their control of knowl-
edge."); see alsoJAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOVWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF INFORMATION SOCIETY 2 (1996) (stating that information "is a central feature of the
international economy"); WIPO, THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES AND ADDRESSES:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES: FINAL REPORT OF THE WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PRO-
CESS 12, at 4 (1999) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE FIRST WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME
PROCESS] (noting that "the source of wealth is increasingly intellectual, as opposed to phys-
ical, capital"), available at http://wipo2.wipo.int/processI/report/doc/report.doc.
52 See infra Part II.A (discussing the importance of bridging the global digital divide).
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Administration undertook aggressive efforts to bridge the digital
divide by wiring classrooms, libraries, and rural health care provid-
ers in the United States."3
Although many people are aware of the potential and impor-
tance of the digital revolution, not all of them have access to com-
munications technologies. Building a telecommunications
infrastructure and creating technological applications require sub-
stantial investment of capital. Unfortunately, those communities
that are in the most desperate need of basic information technol-
ogy and telecommunications infrastructure rarely provide attrac-
tive markets. 4  Nor do these communities possess the
technological know-how needed to operate the new technologies.
Even worse, many of these communities are struggling just to meet
their basic needs, such as clean drinking water, food, shelter, elec-
tricity, schools, and basic health care. As a result, many people are
forced to miss out on the opportunities created by the digital
revolution.
Poverty and socio-economic constraints are not the only barri-
ers to digital participation. Even in affluent societies, people with
special needs, such as those with physical disabilities, may not be
5_3 One of the notable efforts in this area during the Clinton Administration was the E-
Rate program, which required telecommunications carriers to provide discounted Internet
hookups and connection for schools, libraries, and rural health care providers in the
United States. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b)(6) (2000). Established pursuant to the universal
service provisions under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, this program had acceler-
ated the adoption of Internet technologies in American schools, libraries, and health care
providers and had helped connect the younger generation to educational resources availa-
ble on the Internet. See Kennard & Lyle, supra note 50, at 6 (describing the achievements
of the E-Rate Program); THE E-RATE IN AMERICA: A TALE OF FOUR CITIES (Andy Carvin ed.,
2000), available at http://www.benton.org/e-rate/e-rate.4cities.pdf (presenting four case
studies of the E-Rate Program); see alsoJessica L. Malman, Note, Connecting Students to 'The
Net': Guiding Principles from State Constitutions, 7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 53 (2000)
(discussing the efforts to rectify the disparity between the level and quality of Internet
access afforded to disadvantaged and more affluent students). For discussions of contro-
versies surrounding the E-Rate Program and what many referred to as the "Gore Tax," see
Angele A. Gilroy, Telecommunications Discounts for Schools and Libraries: The "E-Rate" Program
and Controversies, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, at http://www.cnie.org/nle/st-52.html
(Sept. 15, 2000); Benton Foundation, Follow the E-Rate Debate, at http://tuno.benton.org/e-rate/
(last visited Dec. 30, 2001); Benjamin M. Compaine, The Advocates: Raising the Stakes, in
DIGITAL DIVIDE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 39, at 193 ("With many teachers still at a loss on
how to bring computers and the Internet into their classroom in a meaningful way, the
multi-billion commitment of funds from the E-rate may be a leap of faith: Build it and
hopefully they will come (before it gets obsolete).").
54 See Hammond, Telecommunications Act, supra note 47, at 188 (noting that "businesses
seek out communities which have made the necessary investment in network infrastructure
as part of their competitive strategy"); see also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE & U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRIC., ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN RURAL AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE OF BRINGING
BROADBAND SERVICE TrO ALL AMERICANS ii (2000) [hereinafter ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS IN RURAL AMERICA] (noting that the primary reason for slower broadband deploy-
ment rate in rural America is economic), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/
ruralbb42600.pdf.
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able to obtain access to information technology that many have
taken for granted. Undeniably, the Internet has created a lot of
unprecedented opportunities for people with disabilities and allow
these people to complete tasks that they otherwise would not have
been able to complete without others' assistance." However, be-
cause companies fail to consider their needs and physical limita-
tions, many of them have to struggle on the unfortunate side of the
digital divide.56 Fortunately, with the development of adaptive
technologies," increasing government regulation, 58  and wide-
spread use of accessibility guidelines and policies for developing
websites,59 many people with disabilities become able to cross the
digital divide and to participate in the information revolution.
55 See Digital Divide Initiatives: Are They Accessible to People with Disabilities, DIGITAL DIVIDE
NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/index.cfm?key=76 (last
visited Dec. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Digital Divide Initiatives] ("Paying bills, grocery shop-
ping, and even learning about other adaptive technology and support services-tasks that
previously forced people with disabilities to be dependent on others-can all be accom-
plished over the Internet with no assistance at all .... ); Kennard & Lyle, supra note 50, at
6-7 (describing how communications technologies have made the life of a deaf child much
easier).
56 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 66 (Basic Books 1999)
[hereinafter LESSIG, CODE] ("When graphics entered the Net through the World Wide
Web, the blind became 'blind' again."); Celli & Dreifach, supra note 26, at 57 (describing
the incompatibility of websites with software and equipment used by people with
disabilities).
57 See Digital Divide Initiatives, supra note 55 ("Adaptive technology, such as text-to-
speech output for blind and visually impaired and speech-to-text input for mobility im-
paired communities affords individuals unparalleled opportunities to independently ac-
complish numerous activities of daily life."); see also Deciphering Access for People with
Disabilities, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/sto-
ries/index.cfm?key=188 (Oct. 1, 2001) (describing adaptive solutions that promotes In-
ternet access for people with disabilities).
58 Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1998, 29 U.S.C. § 794(d)
(2000) (requiring federal agencies to accommodate the needs of the disabled when they
develop, procure, maintain, or use electronic and information technology); see also Doe v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding in dicta that Title III
of the American with Disabilities Act forbids owners and operators of a website to "exclude
disabled persons from entering the facility and, once in, from using the facility in the same
way that the nondisabled do"); Jonathan Bick, Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet,
10 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 205 (2000) (discussing section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1998); Paul Taylor, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 7 B.U.
J. Sci. & TECH. L. 26 (2001) (highlighting the costs of applying the ADA accessibility re-
quirements to the Internet and the substantial First Amendment implications of applying
such requirements to private Internet sites and services).
59 For example, many websites and information technology professionals have used the
Web Content Accessibility Guidelines developed by the Web Accessibility Initiative of the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). See Kennard & Lyle, supra note 50, at 14 (describing
W3C's accessibility guidelines); Digital Divide Initiatives, supra note 55 (describing the bene-
fits of W3C's accessibility guidelines); see also Beth A. Haler, Ignored Aspect of Digital Divide,
BALT. SUN, July 22, 2001, at IC (explaining why bridging the digital divide makes good
business sense); Jenny Strasburg, Pushing for Net Access, SAN FRAN. EXAMINER, Mar. 26, 2000,
at BI (articulating market-based arguments for making websites accessible to people with
disabilities).
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C. Affordability
Not everybody can afford new communications technologies
and the expenses incurred in upgrading the equipment, software,
and training support. In most undeveloped or underdeveloped
markets, the costs of hardware and software and the connection
fees are so high that Internet access remains out of reach for most
people in those markets. According to figures supplied by the
United Nations, using the Internet for an hour in Chad in 1999 was
$10.50, while the average yearly salary of its inhabitants was only
$187.6 o It would be hard to imagine why anyone would spend his
or her entire annual income on using the Internet for less than
twenty hours.
Worse still, with the increasing use of interactive graphics and
multimedia technologies, such as Java applets, Shockwave anima-
tions, ActiveX controls, QuickTime audios, and RealAudio videos,
high-speed Internet access may be needed to access information
from sophisticated websites that gear toward high-end customers,
many of whom already have installed broadband technologies.6 1
Unfortunately, most people in low-income neighborhoods, rural
areas, and the less developed countries cannot afford these high-
speed services. As Robert McChesney pointed out, in the United
States alone, the expensive fees for high-speed Internet access
"would all but rule out about half of [its] population."6 2 If half of
Americans would be shut out of the broadband market, one might
wonder how many of those in the less and least developed coun-
tries would be able to use these high-speed services.
So far, the high cost of Internet connection remains the major
barrier to Internet access. However, as the New Economy becomes
more developed and as companies put more protected informa-
tion on the Internet, the cost of privatized Internet content may
become a major factor of the unaffordability equation." Commen-
tators repeatedly have documented the increased costs of priva-
tized information. For example, "when data from the Landsat
series of remote sensing satellites were privatized in the 1980s, the
prices charged to most users, including academic and federal gov-
60 See U.N. Fears Divisive Impact of the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A16.
61 See Michelle Kessler, Digital Divide Keeps Growing, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2001, at 4E
("The Digital divide used to be between Internet and non-Internet users. But as Websites
become more elaborate, the gap grows between broadband and dial-up users.").
62 ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLITICS IN
DUBIOUS TIMES 162 (1999).
63 See infra Part III.G (discussing the increased privatization of information and enclo-
sure of the public domain).
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ernment users[,] increased from $400 to $4,400 per image. '"64
Likewise, after major corporate consolidations in the publishing
field, average prices for scholarly and scientific research journals
rose twenty to thirty percent.65  The journal Brain alone costs
$15,000 a year, 66 beyond what most government agencies and uni-
versity research libraries could afford.
D. Availability
Even with Internet access, many people may not be able to
find information that is relevant to their lives and communities.6 7
Today, most Internet content is generated by companies that are
driven primarily by their business interests. To maximize profits,
these companies may tend to focus on the "right" customers, who
have more disposable income and thus potential interests in their
products. 68 They also may carry content provided by themselves,
their affiliates, and corporate partners, while clouting out informa-
tion supplied by their competitors and other unaffiliated content
providers. 69  As a result, low-income and underserved Internet
users may have difficulty in obtaining information that is relevant
to their lives and communities. M Without access to such content,
these users would still be shut out of the digital revolution even if
64 J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 51, 121 (1997).
65 See BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY xli (6th ed. 2000).
66 See id.
67 See THE CHILDREN'S PARTNERSHIP, ONLINE CONTENT FOR LOW-INCOME AND UNDER-
SERVED AMERICANS: THE DIGITAL DIVIDE'S NEW FRONTIER (2000) (noting the lack of materi-
als and applications serving the needs and interests of low-income and underserved
Internet users), available at http://www.childrenspartnership.org/pub/low income/
lowincome.pdf; RANETA LAWSON MACK, THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: STANDING AT THE INTERSEC-
TION OF RACE & TECHNOLOGY 167 (2001) ("No matter how reasonably priced personal
computers are now or in the future, people will simply not embrace computer technology
on a widespread basis until it is also shown to be relevant to their daily lives."); Kevin
Taglang, Content and the Digital Divide: What Do People Want, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at
http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/-index.cfm?key=14 (Aug. 8, 2000)
[hereinafter Taglang, Content and the Digital Divide] (noting that people need the ability to
create or share community-relevant information to realize the full potential of the
Internet).
68 See THE CHILDREN'S PARTNERSHIP, supra note 67, at 17 (noting that "online content
has been primarily designed for Internet users who have discretionary money to spend").
69 See Frank Rich, Two 21st Century Foxes Elope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000, at A17 (noting
that public interest groups "worry that AOL Time Warner and its kin will run their fast
Internet wires like private toll roads, banning other Internet providers or diverting them to
slow and bumpy traffic lanes").
70 As Robert McChesney noted in his research on the commercial news media:
In recent years, the increased focus by the commercial news media on the more
affluent part of the population has reinforced and extended the class bias in
the selection and tenor of material. Stories of great importance to tens of mil-
lions of Americans will fall through the cracks because those are not the "right"
Americans, according to the standards of the corporate news media.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 62, at xix.
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they have access to the Internet and new communications
technologies.
Another barrier to digital participation is language. Due to
the origin and early development of the Internet,7 most Internet
content is available in English only. 72 As a result, those who do not
read English may have difficulty in locating information in a lan-
guage they understand. 3 Nonetheless, with the help of free online
translation services and the increased production of Internet con-
tent in languages other than English, the language barrier on the
Internet has been narrowing. In fact, forecasts cited at a recent
United Nations-sponsored symposium on multilingual Internet ad-
dresses predict that Chinese will outrank English as the most
widely-used language on the Internet by 2007. TM
Furthermore, the lack of cultural diversity and local informa-
tion makes the Internet unattractive to many people,7 especially
those in rural areas and in the less developed countries. In an in-
sightful analogy, Professor Henry Louis Gates, Jr. compared the dif-
ferent attitudes between black and white families toward the
71 For interesting discussion of the origin of the Internet, see generally TIM BERNERS-
LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE
WEB (2000); KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS
OF THE INTERNET (1998); JOHN NAUGHTON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FUTURE: FROM RADIO
DAYS TO INTERNET YEARS IN A LIFETIME (2000).
72 See Ham ish Mcrae, Only Deregulation and Competition Can Help Close the Digital Divide,
INDEPP'NDENT (London), Jan. 19, 2001, at 20 (noting that "the Net is virtually a monol-
ingual zone" for commercial applications).
73 As Pippa Norris noted:
A comprehensive analysis of more than one billion unique Web pages by the
Inktomi search engine found that 87 percent of all documents were in English,
a language understood by an estimated one in ten people worldwide. This pic-
ture is confirmed by a more limited search in 1997 by the Babel team for the
Internet Society which estimated that 84 percent of all pages in English, fol-
lowed by German (4.5 percent), Japanese (3.1 percent), French (1.8 percent),
Spanish (1.2 percent), Swedish (1.1 percent), and Italian (1 percent), with all
other languages each below 1 percent.
NORRIS, supra note 1, at 59-60; see also THE CHILDREN'S PARTNERSHIP, supra note 67, at 17
(noting that 87 percent of documents on the Internet are written in English and that at
least 32 million Americans use a primary language other than English).
74 See Frances Williams, Chinese to Become Most-used Language on Web, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2001, at 12.
75 See THE CHILDREN'S PARTNERSHIP, supra note 67, at 16 (describing the lack of local
information on the Internet and that such a lack disproportionately affects Internet users
living among low-income households); id. at 17 (noting that the lack of cultural diversity in
available Internet content serves as a barrier for many of the 26 million foreign-born Amer-
icans); NORRIS, supra note 1, at 60 (noting'"the lack of Web content in indigenous lan-
guages, as well as the limited local relevance of the available sites, limits the incentive to go
online for much of the population" in Southern Asia); Frederick Noronha, In a Software
Superpower, Rural Kids Lack the Code to Learn, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://
www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/-index.cfm?key=166 (last visited Dec. 30,
2001) (noting the lack of education software in Kannada language in India).
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Internet today to their different attitudes toward records in the
1920s:
Consider the birth of the recording industry in the 1920's.
Blacks began to respond to this new medium only when main-
stream companies like Columbia Records introduced so-called
race records, blues and jazz discs aimed at a nascent African-
American market. Blacks who would never have dreamed of
spending hard-earned funds for a record by Rudy Vallee or Kate
Smith would stand in lines several blocks long to purchase the
new Bessie Smith or Duke Ellington hit.
76
If the Internet contained more diverse and relevant informa-
tion, more people would be drawn to the Internet, and the gap
between the information haves and have-nots might reduce.7 7 In-
terestingly, "despite the tremendous surge in ethnic portals, there
is a lack of Internet content generated by ethnic communities




Access to information technology and Internet content is es-
sential. However, such access is useful only if people are able to
adapt to the changing technological environment and to use the
new technological tools effectively. 79 So far, computer illiteracy,
technophobia, and cyberphobia have posed significant barriers to
participation in the New Economy." Outdated structures and
76 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., One Internet, Two Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, § 4, at 15.
77 See Hoffman et al., supra note 39 (noting that an individual would be motivated to
actively consume information if the information is of personal relevance to the individual
or if it will be discussed in the individual's social circle).
78 Taglang, Content and the Digital Divide, supra note 67.
79 See id. ("To realize the potential of today's information tools, people need the skills
to operate them to better their lives and the health of their communities."); Kennard &
Lyle, supra note 50, at 16-19 (emphasizing the need for the industry to ensure that the
information technology is usable by all Americans who want to use it); William E. Kennard,
Equality in the Information Age, 51 FF0. COMM. L.J. 553, 554 (1999) ("In the New Economy,
every child without access to the Internet and without technology skills inherits a lifetime
of missed opportunity."); Maier, supra note 12, 37 ("Because of the pervasiveness of [in-
formation technology], a child who does not have adequate Internet access today, will be
the handicapped citizen of tomorrow."); see also OKINAWA CHARTER ON GLOBAL INFORMA-
TION SOCIETY art. 11 (July 24, 2000) [hereinafter OKINAWA CHARTER] (emphasizing the
need "to nurture [information and communication technology] literacy and skills through
education, lifelong learning and training"), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/
econ/group8/summitO/-wwwhinfo.html; Fulton, supra note 36, at 182 ("In a connected
society, consumer demand, market prices, and disposable income are highly correlated
with one's ability to read, write, do math and compute.").
80 See AMANDA LENHART, WHO'S NOT ONLINE: 57% OF THOSE WITHOUT INTERNET ACCESS
SAY THEY Do NOT PLAN TO LOG ON (2000) (finding that 54% of those without Internet
access considered the Internet dangerous), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/re-
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working practices also make it difficult for people to gain the full
benefits of the digital economy.
81
In low-income neighborhoods, rural areas, and the less devel-
oped countries, basic illiteracy creates an even more significant
barrier to digital participation.82 Although the Internet is rich in
visual imagery and audio content, most material on the Internet
"remains closer to text-based newspapers rather than to audio or
visual electronic media like television."83 Thus, basic illiteracy
could still exclude a large segment of the world population from
the information revolution "even if computing equipment became
more widely available through Internet cafes, schools, public librar-
ies, and community centers."84
II. THE GLOBAL DIGITAL DIVIDE
A. A Global Problem
Information is the lifeblood of the New Economy. Today, the
world is "approaching the point where not having access to [infor-
mation technology] is likely to put an individual at a competitive
disadvantage and in a position of being a less-than-full participant
in the digital economy."85 Information technology is no longer a
luxury, but a development tool8 6 and a critical means of informa-
ports/pdfs/-PewThoseNotOnlineReport.pdf; MACK, supra note 67, at 3-33 (describing
why minority communities might legitimately fear technological advancements and are
therefore unlikely to immediately embrace computer technology); Beth Mazur, Barriers to
Participation for Older Persons, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.
org/content/stories/-index.cfm?key=77 (last visited Dec. 30, 2001) (listing computer illit-
eracy and cyberphobia as two major barriers for getting senior citizens online).
81 See Robert Taylor, Bridging the Digital Divide, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2001, at 11 (arguing
that governments, companies, and employees must change their working practices to gain
the full benefits of the New Economy).
82 See THE CHILDREN'S PAWINERSHIP, supra note 67, at 17 (noting that the vast majority
of Internet content is written for an audience that reads at an average or advanced literacy
level, which is lacking in 22 percent of American adults); Digital Divide Network Staff,
Benton Foundation, Digital Bridges Are Not Always Digital, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at
http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/index.cfm?key40 (last visited Dec.
30, 2001) (noting that basic illiteracy creates a major barrier to digital participation); see
also NORRIS, supra note 1, at 59 ("One-fifth of the world's population remains illiterate, and
the total rises to 40 percent or more of those living in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East,
and Southern Asia, with even higher figures for female population.").
83 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 59.
84 Id.
85 FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 7, at 89; see also NORRIS, supra note 1, at 68
("The chief concern about the digital divide is that the underclass of info-poor may be-
come further marginalized in societies where basic computer skills are becoming essential
for economic success and personal advancement, entry to good career and educational
opportunities, full access to social networks, and opportunities for civic engagement.").
86 "In poorer villages and isolated communities, a well-placed computer, like a commu-
nal well or an irrigation pump, may become another development tool, providing essential
information about storm warnings and crop price for farmers, or medical services and legal
land records for villagers." NORRIS, supra note 1, at 4041; see also Celia W. Dugger, Connect-
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tion exchange in the New Economy.
As a recent report by the Department of Commerce noted,
active participation in the information revolution will promote a
country's economic development. s7 Indeed, the Internet and new
communications technologies offer the less developed countries
unprecedented opportunities to acquire knowledge, "enhance ed-
ucational systems, improve policy formation and execution, and
widen the range of opportunities for business and the poor."8 8
They also allow these countries to leapfrog conventional obstacles
of technological, industrial, and infrastructural development.
89
By realizing the full potential of the information revolution,
countries could "meet[ ] more effectively their vital development
goals, such as poverty reduction, health, sanitation, and educa-
tion."" They also could foster market globalization, which, in
turn, would increase the country's recognition in the international
community, attracting foreign tourists and investors and allowing
the country to benefit from global e-commerce.9' Moreover,
through distance-learning technologies, students in the less devel-
oped countries would be able to "access the same electronic jour-
nals, books, and databases as students at the Sorbonne, Oxford, or
Harvard."9 '
Unfortunately, not all countries can benefit from the informa-
tion revolution. Consider sub-Saharan Africa, for example. While
the developed countries had hundreds of computers per 1000 peo-
ple in 1999, there were only 8.4 per 1000 people in sub-Saharan
Africa'.9 3 "Half a billion people living [there] share 14 million
phone lines, fewer than in Manhattan or in Tokyo."94 And "for
every 100 people there are only 17 radio sets, 5 televisions, and 0.5
ing Rural India to the World, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2000, at A1O (describing how a well-placed
computer can link an isolated village in the southern tip of India to the borderless world of
knowledge).
87 See ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2000 v-
viii (2000), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/De2000rev.pdf.
88 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 64 (quoting WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 9
(1999)).
89 See OKINAWA CHARTER, supra note 79, art. 12.
90 Id.
91 See NORRIS, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that the Internet allows "small craft industries
and the tourism industry in Bali or the Maldives [to] deal directly with customers and
vacationers in New York, and London, irrespective of distance, the costs of advertising, and
the intermediate distribution chains of travel agents and retail businesses"); Thomas L.
Friedman, Digital Divide or Dividend, N.Y. TIM ES, Mar. 16, 2001, at A19 (describing how the
Internet could reward sustainable cultural practices and create a global market for indige-
nous cultures).
92 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 7; see also Mike Bowler, Library Bridges a Digital Divide, BALT.
SUN, Feb. 21, 2001, at 2B (describing the potential of digital libraries).
93 WORLD BANK, supra note 23, at 308.
94 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 16.
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percent mobile phones."95 "Even at ... universities, where technol-
ogy usage is most pronounced, most institutions are plagued by the
absence of phones, electrical outlets, and an inadequate national
infrastructure.
96
When viewed in terms of the quality of the services provided,
the picture becomes even gloomier. For example, the phone sys-
tems "are spotty and often rely on antiquated equipment, and
[their] progress is hamstrung by bureaucracy, outdated administra-
tive structures and, in most instances, state-owned monopolies."9 "
Likewise, the power distribution network is grossly inadequate, ir-
regular, and sometimes nonexistent, and power supply remains un-
available in many rural areas.9 ' To make matters even worse,
countries in the region are constantly troubled by a large variety of
domestic problems, such as "ineffective government and weak insti-
tutions; poverty; ethnicity; power struggles within and among the
elite; poor services and weak public institutions; corruption and
nepotism; faulty allocation of resources; foreign interference; and
instability as a result of that very fluid and political culture.""
Nonetheless, the situation is improving with large-scale shar-
ing of information resources,.0 0  increasing liberalization of the
telecommuni-cations sector and the Internet market, and active de-
95 Id.
96 J.M. Spectar, Bridging the Global Digital Divide: Frameworks for Access and the World Wire-
less Web, 26 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 57, 63 (2000). As one commentator noted:
A survey by the Association of African Universities found that while 52 of the
232 academic and research institutions had full Internet connectivity, 180
others had "inadequate" access. While most institutions have some e-mail ser-
vices, "many are unable to provide meaningful Internet access." In addition,
most African universities are "facing severe financial crises," thus making it "im-
possible for many institutions to tap into the technological revolution."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
97 Daniel Akst & Mike Jensen, Africa Goes Online, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://
www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/index.cfm?key=158 (June 2, 2001).
98 See id. "In many countries the power distribution network does not reach signifi-
cantly into rural areas, and 'power sharing' (regularly scheduled outages lasting for many
hours) is a regular occurrence, even in some capital cities." Id.
99 Africa Ready to Undo Past Errors and Confront Truth, No Matter How Painful, Security
Council Told; Council Hears 37 Speakers in Day-long Meeting on Africa, M2 PRESSWIRE, Jan. 30,
2002, available at Lexis, News Library, ALLNWS File (quoting Zambia's Minister of Foreign
Affairs).
10( One commentator suggested that the large-scale sharing of information resources in
Africa might pave the way for widespread use of shared public Internet terminals:
[L]arge-scale sharing of information resources is a dominant feature of the Af-
rican media landscape. A given copy of any newspaper might be read by more
than ten people, there are usually perhaps three users per dial-up Internet ac-
count, and it is not uncommon to find most of a small village crowded around
the only TV set, often powered by a car battery or small generator. Why not
shared public Internet terminals?
Akst & Jensen, sulra note 97.
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ployment of information technology.'0 ' For example, Kenya "re-
cently established the first public Internet peering point exchange
for [Internet service providers] in Africa outside of South Af-
rica. ' 10 2 It also "rolled out its first national Internet backbone con-
necting six cities with the use of digital switches, fiber-optic cable
and satellite services."' ' Likewise, Nigeria opened up its Internet
market by licensing thirty-eight Internet service providers to sell
services. 1°4
Moreover, countries in Africa have worked together to build a
regional Internet backbone. Among the best known and most im-
portant telecommunications projects is Africa One, which "aims to
put a 32,000 kilometer optical fiber necklace around the entire
continent by 2002. " 05 According to the company, the project,
once complete, "will not only vastly expand telephone and Internet
capacity on the continent, but will also eliminate $600 million a
year in connection fees that Africans pay to complete international
telephone calls-many of them between African nations."'0 6
Some commentators have questioned the urgency of efforts to
bridge the global digital divide and contended that the divide is
only a temporary phenomenon that will fade gradually over
time. ° 7 As they explained, the cost of information technology is
101 "AfricaOnline [alone] had approximately 100 000 users spread across 740 outlets in
Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe before it began its new programme
of fewer, liarge [sic] branded I-cafes." The African Internet-A Status Report, DIGITAL DIVIDE
NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/index.cfm?key=147
(last visited Dec. 30, 2001). For the latest update on Internet development in Africa, see id.
102 Akst & Jensen, supra note 97. "A peering point is a neutral computer where [In-
ternet service providers] can exchange traffic between their respective users without hav-
ing to do so via their international links. That saves time and bandwidth." Id.
103 Id.
104 See id. Twelve of these providers have since become active. See id.
105 Id. For an overview of Africa One, see Wiring a Continent for the 21st Century: The Africa
ONE Project Overview, at http://www.africaone.com/english/about/about.cfm.
o6 Akst & Jensen, supra note 97.
107 See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce, 21 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 563, 565 (2000) (arguing that concerns about the digital divide are
"overblown" because Internet technology continues to lower the cost of bringing elec-
tronic commerce to a poor person or one located in a rural area with poor infrastructure);
Lloyd Morrisett, Foreword to DIGITAL DIVIDE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 39, at ix (asserting the
author's belief that "controversies about the 'digital divide' will fade away"); Robert W.
Crandall, The Digital Divide: Bridging the Digital Divide-Naturally, BROOKINGS REV., Jan. 1,
2001, at 38 (arguing that "[g]overnment policymakers should relax and let the booming
economy close the digital divide"); Adam D. Thierer, How Free Computers Are Filling the Digi-
tal Divide, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 20, 2000 (arguing that there is no digital
divide crisis as the costs of Internet connectivity are decreasing and as Internet penetration
occurs more rapidly than previous technologies had), available at http://
www.heritage.org/library/-backgrounder/pdf/bg_1361.pdf; Eric Cohen, United We Surf
WKLY. STANDARD, Feb. 28, 2000, at 26 (noting that the digital divide "is based more on myth
than reality, and offers only mythical solutions to real problems"); Adam Clayton Powell,
III, Falling for the Cap: Whatever Happened to the Digital Divide?, in DIGITAL DIVIDE
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 39, at 309 ("Misled by stereotypes, misinformed about survey tech-
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decreasing rapidly, while the quality of Internet service is improv-
ing quickly. Thus, new communications technologies may create a
window of opportunities that allows the less developed countries to
catch up with the developed countries, " " just like how Internet
start-ups caught up with the bricks-and-mortar companies.' °9 In-
deed, a recent report by the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) noted that "expenditure in non-
OECD countries has been growing at more than double the OECD
average, with especially rapid expansion in telecommunications
and [information technology] hardware investments in Brazil and
China."1 0
Other commentators are less optimistic, however. As they
pointed out, information revolution benefits not only the less de-
veloped countries, but also the developed countries.' Although a
fast follower may sometimes perform better than a first mover in
some commercial situations, "in terms of power among states, it is
usually better to be a first mover than a fast follower."" 12 After all,
first movers in the information technology field "are often the cre-
ators of the standards and architecture of information systems."' 1
3
nologies, and misdirected by interest groups, the media have treated the digital divide as a
crisis requiring government intervention."), available at http://reason.com/9911/
fe.ap.falling.shtml; Jube Shiver, Jr., Big Bandage for a Narrowing Internet Gap, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2000, at Al (noting that "government intervention [to bridge the digital divide] is not
needed and is a waste of money in an age of low cost computers and online access"). But
see Hammond, Digital Divide, supra note 31, at 136 (criticizing this argument for its failure
"to acknowledge the near-term dangers of exclusion when time is measured in Internet,
rather than standard, years").
108 World Bank Economist Carlos Braga expressed his optimism:
Although, no doubt, income and wealth inequality may increase in the initial
stages of the process, catch-up can also happen at a much faster pace than in
the past. [Information and communication technology] spending, for exam-
ple, grew more quickly in most developing regions than in high-income econo-
mies in the 1992-97 period. And countries like South Africa and Brazil already
boast a higher share of networked personal computers than most industrialized
economies.
Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, Inclusion or Exclusion, LE COURIER, Dec. 1998, available at
http://www.unesco.org/courier/1998_12/uk/dossier/tt2l.htm; see also ROBERT 0. KEO-
IANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 221 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that infor-
mation technology may minimize costs, create economies of scale, lower market entry
barriers, and reduce the power of the large states while enhancing the power of small states
and nonstate actors).
109 "In less than a decade, innovative companies with the flexibility and imagination to
take advantage of digital technologies, such as Amazon.com and eBay, have challenged the
market share held by established companies." NORRIS, supra note 1, at 239. Although
thousands of these start-ups failed in the recent dot-coin crash, some succeeded and con-
tinues to grow despite the crash.
110 Id. at41.
I I See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 108, at 221 (arguing that some aspects of the informa-
tion revolution help the small states while others help the already large and powerful).
112 Id. at 222.
113 Id.
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In fact, given the lack of technological know-how and communica-
tions infrastructure, the information revolution might make it
more difficult for the less developed countries to catch up. Thus,
one might wonder whether new communications technologies
would widen the economic disparity between the developed and
less developed countries.114
To date, "Et] he World Bank, the United Nations, and the G-8
have expressed alarm that poorer societies lacking technological
investment will drift farther behind their wired rivals in the global
marketplace, whereas advanced industrialized societies will surge
even farther ahead on the back of dramatic productivity gains."11
To narrow this widening technological gap, "[m]ultiple policy ini-
tiatives have been proposed, such as investment in technological
infrastructure in Malaysia, computer training and education in
schools in Latvia, and innovative community-level schemes in
Bangladesh."'
116
A good example is the Digital Opportunity Taskforce (Dot
Force) established by the leading industrialized countries at the re-
cent G-8 summit in Okinawa. On that occasion, the leading indus-
trialized countries called for "both the public and private sectors to
bridge the international information and knowledge divide." ' As
they declared in the Okinawa Charter on Global Information
Society:
Our vision of an information society is one that better enables
people to fulfil their potential and realise their aspirations. To
this end we must ensure that [information and communication
technology] serves the mutually supportive goals of creating sus-
tainable economic growth, enhancing the public welfare, and
114 As Pippa Norris described:
If investment in digital technologies has the capacity to boost productivity, ad-
vanced economies such as Sweden, Australia, and the United States at the fore-
front of the technological revolution may be well placed to pull even farther
ahead, maintaining their edge in future decades. A few middle-level econo-
mies like Taiwan, Brazil, and South Korea may manage to leverage themselves
profitably into niche markets within the global marketplace, servicing interna-
tional corporations based elsewhere by providing software development or
manufacturing silicon chips. But most poorer societies, lagging far behind,
plagued by multiple burdens of debt, disease, and ignorance, may join the digi-
tal world decades later and, in the long-term, may ultimately fail to catch up.
NORRIS, supra note 1, at 5; see also FRANcIsco RODRIGUEZ & ERNESTJ. WILSON, Ii, ARE POOR
COUNTRIES LOSING THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION? (The World Bank InfoDev Working Pa-
per Series 2000) (noting the growing disparity in information and communication technol-
ogies between rich and poor countries), available at http://www.infodev.org/library/
wilsonrodriguez.doc.
115 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 39.
116 Id.
117 OKINAWA CHARTER, supra note 79, art. 5.
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fostering social cohesion, and work to fully realise its potential
to strengthen democracy, increase transparency and accounta-
bility in governance, promote human rights, enhance cultural
diversity, and to foster international peace and stability."'
Pursuant to this Charter, the G-8 established the dot force to
assist in integrating the less developed countries in the emerging
global information network; to facilitate a dialogue and coopera-
tion between the developed and less developed countries, interna-
tional organizations, and the private sector; and to increase the
global awareness of challenges and opportunities caused by the
digital revolution."'
B. Global Benefits
Although commentators and policymakers sometimes de-
scribe efforts to bridge the digital divide as a "moral imperative"
and as a matter of social justice, 20 there are many nonaltruistic
reasons why the developed countries should help bridge the global
digital divide.
First, like all other communications technologies-such as
telephone, television, cable, and fax machines-the Internet ex-
hibits powerful network effects. 12 ' The more computers are con-
nected and the more information technology is deployed, the
118 Id. art. 2.
119 See id. art. 18.
120 See Spectar, supra note 96, at 86-87 (quoting Arnold Ph. Djiwatampu, Social Justice
Through Communications Access: A Little LEO Proposal, ITU NEWS, May 2000 Spec. Ed., at 40,
42, available at http://www.itu.int/journal/200004/E/pdf/n0400e.pdf).
121 See Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 50-52
(2000) (noting the network externalities created by the Internet); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 545-62 (1998)
(discussing the network effects exhibited by the telephone industry and the Internet);
George Gilder, Metcalfe's Law and Legacy, FORBES, Sept. 13, 1993, at 158 (describing Met-
calfe's Law, which demonstrates that a network's value grows in proportion to the number
of users and information sources connected to it). Seegenerally Dennis W. Carlton &J. Mark
Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among Firms, with Special Reference to Network Industries, 50
U. Ci. L. REV. 446 (1983) (discussing the need for coordinated action among firms in the
network industries to achieve efficiency).
Professors Mark Lemley and David McGowan pointed out that the Internet warrants
special analysis as it includes aspects of many types of networks.
[C]ommunication on the Internet requires adherence to common technical
protocols that, in an elemental sense, define the scope of the Internet. In-
ternet users are not actually linked to one another, however. Rather, the proto-
cols that define the "boundaries" of the Internet merely facilitate software
interoperability. Further, not everyone on the Internet wants to be connected
to everyone else; some would prefer that access to the Internet remain limited,
or at least that they be able to shut themselves off from the masses in a private
group. Nonetheless, at least a significant part of the value of the Internet itself
is the fact that it enables communication among users; in this sense, it is a
classic actual network with characteristics similar to the telephone.
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 121, at 494 (footnote omitted).
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greater is the value of the Internet connection. An increase in In-
ternet penetration in the less developed countries therefore would
increase the benefits of Internet users and service providers in the
developed world. Further improvement in the information infra-
structure of the less developed countries also would accelerate the
speed of the Internet. After all, the practical speed of any network
is limited by the slowest link on that network regardless of the net-
work's maximum capacity.122 Moreover, as Mark Cooper pointed
out in his article in this symposium issue, due to the different rush
hours created by the varying time zones, spreading the user base
across geographic areas would allow the Internet to maximize its
capacity and to balance its access load.
12
Second, information about foreign countries-developed or
otherwise-is badly needed in this increasingly globalized world.
Today, people no longer can live exclusively within their territorial
borders without any knowledge of the rest of the world. 124 Bridg-
ing the global digital divide therefore would facilitate the flow of
information from the less developed countries to the developed
countries, and vice versa. Such an effort would enable citizens and
businesses in the developed countries to make more informed de-
cisions about matters concerning foreign countries and the global
community. It also would allow those in the less developed coun-
tries to acquire information about the global trading system, thus
enabling them to understand better how to compete successfully
in, and to integrate into, the international economy.
Third, the free exchange of information can help countries
acquire what Dean Joseph Nye and Professor Robert Keohane
called "soft power." As these two distinguished political scientists
defined:
Soft power . . . is the ability to get desired outcomes because
others want what you want; it is the ability to achieve desired
outcomes through attraction rather than coercion. It works by
convincing others to follow or getting them to agree to norms
and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power
can rest on the appeal of one's ideas or culture or the ability to
set the agenda through standards and institutions that shape the
preferences of others. It depends largely on the persuasiveness
of the free information that an actor seeks to transmit. If a state
122 See Peter H. Lewis, Picking the Right Data Superhighway, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1999,
at G1.
123 See Cooper, supra note 29, at 85.
124 See Maier, supra note 12, 11 ("No longer can Americans live exclusively within our
continental borders without any knowledge of the rest of the world.").
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can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others and establish
international institutions that encourage others to define their
interests in compatible ways, it may not need to expend as many
of its costly traditional economic or military resources.12
5
The soft power of the developed countries, including the
United States, can be derived from the appeal of ideas such as de-
mocracy, the rule of law, human rights, and individual freedom.
Bridging the global digital divide therefore would help spread the
cultures of these countries and therefore would increase the aware-
ness of their ideas among the less developed world. 126 Such aware-
ness is particularly important in closed societies run by
authoritarian governments, in which alternative sources of infor-
mation are woefully deficient.
27
Fourth, due to the "rudderless, decentralized, and transna-
tional" nature of the Internet architecture, regulation of the In-
ternet is inherently difficult.1 21 Indeed, in many countries in Asia,
the Middle East, Europe, and Latin America, greater freedom is
found on the Internet than in the traditional news media.
1 29
Bridging the global digital divide therefore would facilitate the
flow of information that helps subvert authoritarian and repressive
governments, 130 thus promoting democracy, 31  human rights,
13 2
125 KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 108, at 220.
126 See id. at 221.
127 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye offered an illuminating example:
One of the Iranian students who organized the takeover of the United States
embassy and seizure of hostages in 1979 recently said, "For Americans freedom
is an everyday commodity, but for us, under the Shah's dictatorship, it was
something unknown. So when we took the embassy, we acted on the basis of
what we knew, and that was despotism. Today we have chosen a different
course, based on what we learned from the last twenty years.
Id. at 253.
128 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REv. 447, 448 (2000); see also NOR-
RIS, supra note 1, at 100 (noting that "officials normally find it far more difficult to silence
critical voices on the new media compared with their ability to regulate and control the TV
airwaves"); A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatoy Arbitrage, in BORDERS
IN CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 129
(Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson ed., 1997) (discussing the difficulties of censorship on the
Internet); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1373-74 (1996) (describing how efforts to control the flow of elec-
tronic information across physical borders will likely fail).
129 See Leonard R. Sussman, The Internet in Flux, in FREEDOM HOUSE, How FREE?: THE
WEB & THE PRESS: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF PRESS FREEDOM 4 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 FREE-
DOM HOUSE SURVEY], available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2001/pfs2001.pdf.
130 As Mark Maier noted:
From the economic crisis in Russia to the conflict in Kosovo, the Internet is
providing the means of communication to people who would otherwise be si-
lenced by repressive governments. Communication via the Internet survives
even after dictatorial govern-ments destroy traditional means of communica-
tion, such as broadcast radio. For example, Radio B92, the Kosovo radio station
that was shut down by the Serbian government, has continued to broadcast via
the Internet. Also, after the Serbian government deported all western journal-
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and civil society, 133 as well as transparency, openness, and account-
ability of governing agencies.
1 3
1
In countries where the mass media are tightly controlled,
heavily censored, and cost-prohibitive, the Internet and new com-
munications technologies would create opportunities for elec-
tronic expression by individuals and groups who otherwise would
not have media access. 135 A good example is the Kosovo radio sta-
ists, current news reports were still accessible via the Internet from various indi-
viduals, and even a monastery.
Maier, supra note 12, 11 (footnotes omitted); see also Hiawatha Bray, The Wiring of a
Continent / the World, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 2001, at Al (noting that "political activists in
Nigeria, Ghana, and other countries are using the Internet to rally international opposi-
tion to corrupt or oppressive rulers").
Interestingly, the online community is more interested in political change than the
existing community in physical space. As commentators noted, the online community is
"more tolerant of alternative lifestyles, more sympathetic toward new social movements,
more secular toward moral values, more liberal in general on the social issues although
also more pro-business on the economic agenda." NORRIS, supra note 1, at 238. If these
characteristics held true for the less developed countries, promoting Internet development
in those countries would help "accelerate the process of value change associated with [po-
litical and] societal modernization." Id.
131 See generally CHRISTOPHER R. KEDZIE, COMMUNICATION AND DEMOCRACY. COINCIDENT
REVOLUTIONS AND THE EMERGENT DICTATOR'S DILEMMA (1997) (demonstrating a strong cor-
relation between democratization and interconnectivity), available at http://
www.rand.org/publications/RGSD/RGSD127. See also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democ-
racy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1610 (1999) (noting that "cyberspace has a tre-
mendous potential to revitalize democratic self-governance at a time when a declining level
of participation in communal life endangers civil society in the United States"); Mark Mal-
loch Brown, Democracy and the Information Revolution, CHOICES, Sept. 2001 (describing how
the information revolution is "an equally powerful revolution for democracy and demo-
cratic governance"), available at http://www.undp.org/dpa/choices/2001/september/
commentary.pdf; Gary W. Selnow, The Internet and the Soul of Democracy, DIGITAL DIVIDE
NETWORK, at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/-content/stories/index.cfm?key=191
(Oct. 9, 2001) (arguing that the Internet, due to its interactive nature, has the ability to
"cultivate the soul of democracy"). But see NORRIS, supra note 1, at 22 (arguing that digital
politics in the developed world "functions mainly to engage the engaged"); Dana Ott,
Power to the People: The Role of Electronic Media in Promoting Democracy in Africa, FIRST MONDAY,
at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3-4/ott (Apr. 6, 1998) (arguing that electronic
information will not promote democracy in the absence of parallel efforts ensuring that
access to the Internet is not restricted to urban, elite populations) For a symposium on
Internet voting and its impact on American democracy, see Symposium, Internet Voting and
Democracy, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 979 (2001).
132 See generally Peter Brophy & Edward Halpin, Through the Net to Freedom: Information, the
Internet and Human Rights, 25J. INFO. SCI. 351 (1999).
133 As one commentator explained:
New communication technologies enable citizens of prospective democracies
to learn more about how other societies operate. If they discover that others
living elsewhere live more freely and appear to have a higher quality of life, not
only in a materialistic sense, they are inclined to seek more freedom and de-
mocracy for themselves.
KEDZIE, supra note 131, § 5, at http://www.rand.org/publications/RGSD/RGSD127/
sec5.html.
134 See Norris, supra note 1, at 104 (noting "the ability of the Internet to provide informa-
tion promoting the transparency, openness, and accountability of governing agencies at
national and international levels").
135 See Hammond, Telecommunications Act, supra note 47, at 200 (noting that the Internet
and new communications technologies "have occasioned greater opportunities for elec-
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tion Radio B92, which continued to broadcast via the Internet after
the Serbian government had shut down the station.136  With
shrinking costs, maximizing speed, and broadening reach, infor-
mation technology also would alter the balance between estab-
lished organizations and outside challengers. 37  In addition, by
promoting independent and investigative journalism, 138 it would
allow the media to function as the Fourth Estate, 39 providing di-
versity and a multiplicity of viewpoints and facilitating informed de-
liberation by citizens.
Compared with the traditional news media, the Internet and
new communications technologies would "provide[ ] a more level
playing field for party competition,"140 thus increasing the leverage
of small and emerging parties.' 4 ' Undeniably, major parties have
greater resources to create and maintain professionally-designed
websites that utilize the newest, fastest, and most attractive technol-
ogies. 14 2 However, information technology enables smaller and
tronic expression by individuals and groups who use, but do not own, media"); see also
Howard Rheingold, Electronic Democracy: The Great Equalizer, WHOLE EARTH REV., June 22,
1991, at 4 (arguing that telecommunications "can equalize the balance of power between
citizens and power brokers"). But see NORRIS, supra note 1, at 101 (cautioning that the
Internet in authoritarian regimes "may serve as a traditional agency of state propaganda,
strengthening the government's grip, rather than providing a channel for opposition par-
ties and groups").
136 See Maier, supra note 12, 1 11; see also Arab States Slow in Opening Up to the Internet,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Oct. 21, 2001, available at Lexis, News Library, ALLNWS File
("In Tunisia, journalists have been publishing online magazines ever since their applica-
tion to publish printed products was ignored by the authorities." (internal quotations
omitted)).
137 See NORRIS, supra note 1, at 20 ("The explosive growth of connectivity via the Internet
alters the transmission of information among networks, shrinking costs, maximizing speed,
broadening reach, and eradicating distance. Potentially these changes can have profound
consequences for altering the balance of resources and power between outsider challeng-
ers and established organizations within the political system.").
138 See id. at 100 ("Independent journalism benefits from the relatively low start-up and
production costs for an online weekly newsletter or daily newspaper, compared with pro-
duction and distribution costs of the printed press, or the capital investments required for
radio or TV stations."); Maier, supra note 12, 1 11 (noting that the Internet encourages
people and their governments to base their opinions and conduct on current information
from independent sources).
139 See Maier, supra note 12, 1 12 ("Governments will find it harder to bamboozle their
citizens with misleading information, since those same people will be able to access inde-
pendent information from the Internet."). See generally LUcAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH
ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1991) for a discussion of how the press serves as an auton-
omous, independent check on government.
140 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 156.
141 This is particularly important in countries that are making transition from commu-
nism to democracy, because the communist party in those countries usually remains the
largest and most dominant party in those countries.
142 See id. (noting that "major parties will probably have greater financial and personnel
resources to create and maintain professionally designed websites complete with the latest
multimedia bells and whistles like Java script and Macromedia, steaming audiovisuals, and
opportunities for processing electronic commerce such as secure online payment of mem-
bership dues or campaign donations").
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fringe parties to catch up with major ones. By using free shareware
and web-hosting facilities, "[a] few enthusiastic party supporters
with know-how and technical skills can create a professional-look-
ing site."14 3 Domain names, search engines, and portals-such as
Yahoo!, AOL, and Google-also would allow the general public to
find sites by these parties with greater ease. 144
Finally, although information technology can create an appeal
for the ideas and ways of life in the developed world, it also
presents a vivid picture of the backwardness of the less developed
countries and of the enormous disparities between the developed
and less developed world.' 4 5 To some commentators, these dispar-
ities are far from coincidence and are largely attributed to the un-
fair international economic system, which, these commentators
argue, benefits the developed countries at the expense of the less
developed countries. Attempts to bridge the global digital divide
not only would alleviate mistrust among the less developed coun-
tries, but also would help reduce the tension in the world trading
system and the sense of isolation among people living in those
countries.'46 They also would promote global harmony by
strengthening the voice of those countries and by countering the
role of international intergovernmental organizations.
147
Indeed, if dissatisfaction among the less developed countries
continues to grow and if the global digital divide persists, global
stability and international security might be at stake. Eventually,
the global digital divide might separate the world into two camps,
causing the less developed countries to demand a "new interna-
tional order" that provides equitable access to information technol-
ogy, redistributes information resources under global norms, and
brings fundamental changes to the global economic system."'
143 Id. at 154-56; see also id. at 170 (noting the "modest differences among major, minor
and fringe electoral parties").
144 See id. at 156 (noting that "the barriers to being listed [in search engines] are mini-
mal compared with the difficulties of gaining sustained coverage in the mainstream news
media").
145 See David Kirkpatrick, Tech into Plowshares, FORTUNE, Oct. 15, 2001, at 211.
146 See NORRIS, supra note 1, at 66.
147 See id. at 8 (describing the potential of information technology to "foster[ ] a world-
wide civic society countering the role of international agencies, strengthening the voice of
the developing world, dissolving some of the boundaries of the nation-state, and reinforc-
ing the process of democratization").
148 Such an order would be similar to UNESCO's New World Information and Commu-
nications Order (NWICO). NWICO was an extension of the New International Economic
Order, which attempted to bring about fundamental changes in the international eco-
nomic system by redistributing power, wealth, and resources from the developed North to
the less developed South. See Spectar, supra note 96, at 57 (contending "new order"-style
restructuring schemes would be ineffective in and counterproductive to bridging the
global digital divide).
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Commentators have sometimes justified this order by equating
knowledge with common heritage' 49 and access to information
technology with a fundamental human right.150 Although this or-
der may be effective in protecting the less developed countries, it
might bring the world back to the 1970s and 1980s, when negotia-
tion for international telecommunications was deadlocked.
1 5 1
Even worse, some radicals might turn to extremism, violence,
and terrorism to voice their dissatisfaction with the existing system.
Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washing-
ton, commentators, including myself, have noted the ties between
the attacks and the global inequalities in Internet access. 152 These
ties might have more profound implications when one recalls Karl
Polanyi's classical work, The Great Transformation.1 53 In this book,
Polanyi demonstrated how the social disruptions and inequalities
caused by the Industrial Revolution and globalization in the nine-
teenth century had led to the political reactions of fascism and
communism.' 54 If history were to repeat itself, the tension created
by the digital revolution and the globalization in the New Economy
was particularly alarming.
149 See, e.g., Ronald Wellington Brown, Economic and Trade Related Aspects of Transborder
Data Flow: Elements of a Code for Transnational Commerce, 6J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 66 n.228
(noting that the parties to the Declaration of Buenos Aires on Transborder Data Flow
agreed "to encourage all international actions and policies on harmonization leading to
consider informatics as Mankind's Heritage"); Carl Q. Christol, The Common Heritage of
Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L LAW. 429, 451 (1980) (considering scientific information gleaned
from the moon, broadcast spectra, and orbital positions as part of "intangible natural re-
sources" of the moon that can be designated as the common heritage of mankind); Vigdis
Finnbogad6ttir, Closing Speech at the Second International Congress on Ethical, Legal
and Societal Challenges of Cyberspace (Oct. 3, 1998) (advocating the creation of freeware
that "give[s] the public ... new access to the great heritage of all people on Earth, and all
the knowledge that could serve to improve the world"), available at http://www.unesco.
org/webworld/infoethics_2/eng/-closingremarks.htm.
150 See Finnbogad6ttir, supra note 149 (advocating "a new vision of innovations and ac-
cess to them, based on the premise that information technology is by its very nature a
human right, ought to be regarded as an obvious human right, and ranks alongside the
concept of human liberty itself").
151 See Spectar, supra note 96, at 68-80 (describing the troubled negotiations on interna-
tional telecommunications during the 1970s and 1980s); see also id. at 57 (noting that
"North-South debates concerning access to information and equitable allocation of spec-
trum have often mired the international telecommunications negotiations of the last two
decades").
152 See, e.g., David Wardrop, A Place for Peace in the IT Revolution, DIGITAL DIVIDE NET-
WORK, at http://www.digitaldividenetwork.org/content/stories/index.cfm?key=199 (Nov.
5, 2001); Peter K. Yu, Terrorism and the Global Digital Divide: Why Bridging the Divide Is Even
More Important After September 11, FINDLAw'S WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, at http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/-2002021 1-yu.html (Feb. 11, 2002).
153 KARL PoLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (Octagon Books 1975).
154 See id.
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III. CHALLENGES AHEAD
A. An Ever-changing Definition
Ever since the debate on the digital divide began, the defini-
tion of this divide has changed many times. This change is largely
attributed to the rapid development of the Internet, the prolifera-
tion of digital tools and new communications technologies, and
the constant evolution of the information society. After all, "In-
ternet technology is not going to stand still as long as the market
continues to demand ever smaller, faster, and improved forms of
delivery." '155
"In 1980, a gigabyte of storage cost several hundred thousand
dollars and occupied a room. It now fits on a credit-card device
that can be carried in your pocket."' 56 Just a few years ago, a 56
kbps dial-up telephone modem was the state-of-the-art technology
for personal communications. Today, Internet users demand fat
pipes, fast connection and transmission speeds, and more ad-
vanced forms of information delivery, such as cable, DSL, ISDN, or
even wireless technologies-all of which were, until recently, lim-
ited to businesses and the privileged few who could afford to pay
hundreds or thousands of dollars per month for high-speed In-
ternet access.
157
In light of this technological change, the definition of the digi-
tal divide (and thus the basic tools needed to survive in the digital
economy) will change over time. 58 Although it is very difficult to
155 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 92.
156 Id. at 8.
157 As Peter Lewis wrote:
The key to happiness in the Internet age is bandwidth. Bandwidth, bandwidth,
bandwidth. Fat pipes, capable of sucking down Web pages, music files, video
clips, e-mail and other forms of digital information and entertainment from the
Internet in the blink of an eye. A data spigot that is always open, without busy
signals and without the kinds of delays and service interruptions that drive most
computer users mad.
Lewis, supra note 122, at GI.
158 Not all of the new communications technologies and services should be included in
the definition of the digital divide. Mark Maier put forward this argument by analogizing
Internet services to postal services:
Although the Internet is an important utility that offers many services, not all of
these services need to be made available to all Americans. This is analogous to
the U.S. Postal Service that provides basic service to all Americans at an inex-
pensive price. For additional or special services such as express delivery, there
are added costs and competition from private firms such as Federal Express or
UPS. For example, one can send a first class letter anywhere in the United
States for the affordable price of only thirty-three cents. However, if overnight
service is required from Massachusetts to California, there are a number of
providers that offer this service at prices of ten to twenty dollars.
Internet access should be provided in a similar manner. Basic Internet
service could include browsing the Internet and sending electronic mail (e-
30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT [Vol. 20:1
determine what should constitute these basic tools, 159 we should
constantly review and update the definition so that it corresponds
to the rapidly changing technological environment.16 ° As former
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") Chairman William
Kennard noted, "[t]he landscape of communications is changing
dramatically. Being connected will notjust be about having phone
and perhaps Internet service. It will mean broadband delivery of
increasingly converging services such as interactive voice, data and
full motion video." 6 ' The modem divide might have dominated
the digital divide debate in the past couple of years; the broadband
divide, however, could be the main focus of the debate in the years
to come.
When the Department of Commerce started tracking the digi-
tal divide in 1994, it merely measured the level of telephone, com-
puter, and computer-household modem penetration. 162  The
Internet, which had yet to become popular, was only mentioned
twice-once in the background section and once as a footnote.'63
By the time the third report was issued in 1999, the word "Internet"
mail). Advanced services such as application hosting should not be included in
a basic Internet access service package; rather, they should be available at free
market prices.
Maier, supra note 12, 11 18-19.
159 As former FCC Chairman William Kennard pointed out:
Of course at this stage of deployment of advanced services, it is too early to
predict what services will be considered so critical that they must be universally
affordable. Some technologies, which seem so promising when they are first
introduced, will never be accepted by a critical mass of consumers, as was the
case with the betamax home video technology. Other technologies, like the
television, will achieve almost 100% penetration without any special interven-
tion. Still other technologies, such as compact disc players, will not be deemed
critical enough to ensure that they are universally affordable.
Kennard & Lyle, supra note 50, at 19. Indeed, as Andrew Shapiro pointed out, predicting
how technology will evolve is "notoriously difficult":
Thomas Edison, after all, originally conceived of his phonograph as a way to
record one's thoughts and send them to friends. And the telephone was used
early on in a few places to pipe music into homes from distant concert halls.
Trying to assess the long-term social and political impact of a technology is
even trickier. Certainly no one predicted that the television would become a
kind of baby-sitter. The rapid pace of Net's growth makes it even more difficult
to assess is impact.
ANDREw L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: How INTERNET Is PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN
CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNow 18 (1999).
160 To reflect this rapidly changing technological environment, Professor Allen Ham-
mond included in his proposal an explicit disclaimer that his proposal "does not account
for further changes or upgrades in existing technology, nor does it address what new issues
of equity might arise should a revolutionary technology or application present itself and
destabilize the broadband market." Hammond, Digital Divide, supra note 31, at 155.
161 Kennard & Lyle, supra note 50, at 5; see also MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INTERNET GALAXY
REFLECI-iONS ON THE INTERNET, BUSINESS AND SOCIETY 256 (2001) (noting that "[als soon as
one source of technological inequality seems to be diminishing, another one emerges").
162 See FALLING TIROUGH THE NET I, supra note 7.
163 See id. The word "Web" was mentioned in the same endnote. See id. n.2.
BRIDGING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
was everywhere.' 64 The survey went even further in its final report,
which was released in 2000, by including a separate section on
high-speed Internet access.' 65 As the report noted, "[t]here are
large differences in high-speed access based on income and other
variables, and these initial data will enable [the administration] to
track the increases and diffusion of high-speed access as broad-
band infrastructure is widely adopted." '66
Just as we anticipate the arrival of new communications tech-
nologies, we need to anticipate new ways of living brought about by
the digital revolution. For example, the increased mobility of the
economy and the extensive use of mobile phones and other wire-
less technologies have enabled people to move with ease from one
place to another and to become "wired road warriors" who spend a
substantial amount of time away from home or traditional work-
place.' 67 As a result, the underlying assumptions of some of the
existing telecommunications policies may become invalid. As Pro-
fessor Milton Mueller pointed out insightfully:
Telecommunications access is no longer one simple, homogene-
ous thing. It is becoming increasingly specialized and heteroge-
neous. Those who predicted that electronic communications
would all "converge" into a single, broadband, integrated net-
work are plainly wrong. Access is diverging into many different
forms. Most people will consume more than one of these access
technologies. They may have a fixed voice service at home, but
they will also have some kind of data communication account,
and/or a pager account, a telephone credit or debit card, an
ATM card, and some kind of entertainment-oriented video ac-
count or subscription. Users will want to be able to move in and
out of different types of networks depending on which one is
most appropriate to their needs at a given time.'
68
In light of these changing ways of living, a definition that focuses
solely on computer usage at home or at work might be
164 For the first time, this report addressed Internet penetration among American
households and individuals. See FALLING THROUGH THE NET III, supra note 7, at 33-75. The
report cited two reasons for including an in-depth examination of Internet access and
usage. "First, given the Internet's 'robust growth,' the Internet has assumed an importance
in Americans' everyday lives that compels us to probe more deeply into this new medium.
Second, a sufficient number of people are now online, enabling meaningful surveying and
statistically significant analyses." Id. at 33.
165 See FALLING THROUGH THE NET IV, supra note 7, at 23-25; see also id. at xiii (noting
that the survey examined for the first time household access to high-speed Internet
services).
166 Id. at xiii.
167 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 92.
168 Mueller, supra note 42, at 659.
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misguided.169
Finally, different communities have different conditions and
thus require different solutions. A definition that is useful in one
community may be irrelevant in another. As a result, we should be
sensitive to the particular conditions of a community and con-
stantly evaluate whether the definition makes sense in light of
those conditions. For example, in places where basic information
infrastructure is underdeveloped, next-generation communica-
tions technologies, such as wireless broadband technologies, may
provide better solutions than to upgrade the state of technologies
currently in place.17 ° Indeed, many commentators considered
broadband wireless technologies a viable solution to the network-
ing needs of the Indian Country, many parts of which lacks even
basic telecommunications services.' 71 Thus, if we insisted on defin-
ing the digital divide without paying attention to the needs and
constraints of the affected communities and the existence and po-
tential of new communications technologies, we might misperceive
and mischaracterize the problem, further aggravating the plight of
the information have-nots.
B. An Endless Race
One could hardly finish a race if the referee kept extending
the finish line. With the ever-changing definitions of the digital
divide, one might wonder whether the digital divide will ever be
bridged. Although it is important that we have a finish line, it is
more important that we are running quickly toward the finish line.
The key goal of a digital divide policy is not to eradicate absolute
equalities of access to all information via all networks at all time,
but to ensure that each person has meaningful access to the In-
ternet and new communications technologies and that each per-
son can fully participate in the digital revolution.
As Pippa Norris noted, absolute social inequalities will con-
169 See id. at 660-61 (noting the increasing mobility of the economy and that "most peo-
ple spend a large portion of their waking hours outside of the home").
170 See Celli & Dreifach, supra note 26, at 60 (noting that "[slatellite and wireless tech-
nologies require far less terrestrial infrastructure than broadband technology, and thus
might offer a more economical means for speeding up rural connection"); Kade L. Twist,
Native Networking Trends: Wireless Broadband Networks, DIGITAL DIVIDE NETWORK, at http://
www.digitaldividenetwork.org/-content/stories/index.cfm?key=1 86 (Sept. 24, 2001) [here-
inafter Twist, Native Networking Trends] (noting that technologically leapfrogging" requires
the "deploy[ment of] next-generation communication technologies rather than trying to
improve the state of technologies currently in place"); see also ADVANCED TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS IN RURAL AMERICA, supra note 54, at ii (noting that "[s] atellite broadband service has
particular potential for rural areas as the geographic location of the customer has virtually
no effect on the cost of providing service").
171 See, e.g., Twist, Native Networking Trends, supra note 170.
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tinue to exist in Internet access just as they exist in other dimen-
sions of life. 17 2 Given the substantial inequalities in access to
telephone and cable services, 173 "it would be naive to expect that
the Internet will magically transcend information poverty over-
night," '74 Thus, we should focus on the relative inequalities and
ensure that the Internet and new communications technologies do
not make people's lives more difficult than inequalities of access
currently existed in other forms of communications technologies,
such as telephones and televisions.175
The same logic applies to the global inequalities in Internet
access. Today, there are "substantial disparities in every... dimen-
sions of life from health care and nutrition to education and lon-
gevity. "176 It therefore would be naive to expect that there will be
no absolute inequalities between rich and poor nations in the vir-
tual world. 17 7 It also would be unrealistic to assume that the In-
ternet would "suddenly eradicate the fundamental and intractable
problems of disease, debt, and disadvantage facing developing
countries.' ' 7 ' After all, many of the poor living in Namibia, Brazil,
and Bangladesh do not even have newspapers, radios, and televi-
sion, let alone networked computers and an information
superhighway.
1 79
C. The Mercedes Divide
When the Bush Administration appointed Michael Powell as
the Chairman of the FCC, the new appointee was eager to distance
himself from the activist approaches of his Clinton-appointed pred-
ecessors, Reed Hundt and William Kennard.1 80  Emphasizing a
172 See NORRIS, supra note 1, at 12; see also Compaine, Preface, supra note 39, at xii (noting
that "there have been and will continue to be many gaps-between those who knew how to
farm and those who did not in the Agriculture Age; those who could fix an engine and
those who could not in the Industrial Age; and those who could use a computing appliance
and those who could not in the Information Age").
173 As Pippa Norris pointed out:
Although Alexander Graham Bell's commercial telephone service was
launched in the United States in 1877, today in America, more than a century
later, there remain pockets of racial inequality in access to household tele-
phones. Cable TV started to become available in the mid-1960s but today, ow-
ing to choice or necessity, only two-thirds of American households are
connected, along with about half of all households in industrialized nations.
NORRIS, supra note 1, at 12.
174 Id.




179 See id. at 66.
180 SeeJeffrey Chester & Gary 0. Larson, Whose First Amendment?: Media Conglomeration as
Free Speech, Am. PROSPECT, Dec. 17, 2001, at 28.
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hands-off approach, Chairman Powell considered the digital divide
"a dangerous phrase... [that] could be used tojustify government
entitlement programs that guaranteed poor people cheaper access
to new technology, like digital television sets or computers."'' In a
comment he later regretted,1 8 2 he compared the digital divide to a
"Mercedes divide": "I think there is a Mercedes divide. I would
like to have one, but I can't afford one." '83
Likewise, Bill Gates is not convinced of the urgency of efforts
to bridge the global digital divide. According to him, what the very
poor countries need is clean drinking water, food, schools, and
medicine, rather than computers. 84 In a digital divide conference
in Seattle in 2000, Gates questioned if people knew what it meant
to live on $1 a day: "There's no electricity in that house. None....
You're just buying food, you're trying to stay alive."' 85 He further
elaborated his remarks in a follow-up interview:
The mothers are going to walk right up to that computer and
181 Stephen Labaton, NewFC.C. Chief Would Curb Agency Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001,
at Cl.
182 In a subsequent congressional hearing, Chairman Powell expressed regret for his
comment on the Mercedes Divide. See Chairman Powell's Testimony, supra note 44 (stating
that the Mercedes comment was "regrettable"); see also Celli & Dreifach, supra note 26, at
61 n.52 (discussing the congressional hearing and Chairman Powell's regret about his Mer-
cedes comment).
183 Christopher Stern, New FCC Chairman Favors a Non-Activist Approach, WASH. POST, Feb.
7, 2001, at El. For a critical response to Chairman Powell's remarks by Larry Irving, the
former Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information and Ad-
ministrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, see
Larry Irving, Michael Powell's 'Mercedes Divide,' WASH. POST, June 30, 2001, at A30. See also
Celli & Dreifach, supra note 26, at 61 (criticizing Powell's comment on the Mercedes di-
vide); Labaton, supra note 181, at Cl (reporting that consumer groups considered Powell's
comment insensitive, elitist, and "unnecessarily inflammatory"); Rita Ciolli, Getting Across
the Great Digital Divide, NEWSDAY, Feb. 21, 2001, at C2 (reporting criticisms of the Chairman
Powell's comment).
As many commentators have pointed out, Chairman's Powell remarks were somewhat
unfair. Many people would be happy just to have a Toyota, a Chevy, or even a $500 used
car. According to former FCC Chairman William Kennard, "The analogy is not between
having a Mercedes or a Toyota. It's between having a car or not having a car." Peter G.
Gosselin, Private Prosperities, Public Breakdowns, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, at Al; see also Clar-
ence Page, FCC's Powell Must Help Close 'Digital Divide,' NEWSDAY, Feb. 12, 2001, at A22
(quoting one consumer advocate as saying "A Mercedes? A lot of people will settle for a
bus!"). In the information age, computers and Internet access are no longer luxuries, but
essential communication tools in the New Economy.
184 See Sam Howe Verhovek, Bill Gates Turns Skeptical on Digital Solution's Scope, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2000, at A18 (reporting that Bill Gates discussed in a digital divide confer-
ence about how computers and information technology would not be able to solve imme-
diate problems of the world's poorest people); World's Widest Divide Is Hardly Digital,
SEATrTILE TIMES, Oct. 21, 2000, at A15 (noting that Bill Gates continues to argue that the
divides between water, food, schools, and health are more important than the digital
divide).
185 Verhovek, supra note 184, at A]8; see also Bill Gates, Remarks at the Creating Digital
Dividends Conference in Seattle, Washington (Oct. 18, 2000), available at http://
www.microsoft.com/billgates/speeches/2000/10-18digitaldividends.asp.
[Vol. 20:1
BRIDGING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE
say, "My children are dying, what can you do?" They're not go-
ing to sit there and like, browse eBay or something. What they
want is for their children to live. They don't want their chil-
dren's growth to be stunted. Do you really have to put in com-
puters to figure that out?' 86
Although these remarks were disappointing to those who have
devoted a lot of time, energy, and resources to bridge the digital
divide, these remarks reminded us of the sad reality and cautioned
us not to mistake the tree for the forest. There are a lot of differ-
ent divides, and the digital divide is only one of them. Thus, no
matter how important the digital divide is, it should not over-
shadow those traditional issues that continue to divide the rich and
the poor.
Nonetheless, just as we should not dismiss the racial divide by
noting the existence of the education divide, we should not dismiss
the digital divide by noting the existence of other divides. The dig-
ital revolution has changed virtually every aspect of our lives. The
failure to take advantage of digital opportunities therefore will dis-
enfranchise an important segment of our population.
Moreover, solutions to the digital divide and other, more
traditional divides can work together to reinforce each other. For
example, there is an intertwining relationship between economic
development and the growth of information technology. The pre-
vious Part has already demonstrated how information revolution
can lead to greater economic development." 7 The converse also
could be true. "If countries have the income and affluence then
often (but not always) access to the Internet will follow, along with
connectivity to telephones, radios, and televisions."' Thus, "im-
proving health, food, education and net access should not be seen
as being in opposition to each other. They are all part of the
solution."8 9
D. A Changing Legal Order
Commentators have emphasized ad nauseum how the Internet
and new communications technologies have transformed the
global economy and the international political system. However,
186 Verhovek, supra note 184, at A18.
187 See supra Part II.A.
188 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 67; see also id. at 233 (arguing that the root cause of global
inequalities in digital access is the lack of economic development). "There are some im-
portant exceptions to this generalization-both affluent countries that lack extensive In-
ternet access such as Kuwait and Greece, and middle-income countries that have made
great progress toward online connectivity, such as Slovakia and Estonia." Id. at 67.
189 Victor Keegan, Online: Divide and Rule Out, GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2000, at 2.
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"information does not flow in a vacuum, but in political space that
is already occupied." 90 As Professor Lawrence Lessig pointed out
repeatedly, code is law and the Internet is regulable. t9 ' As a result,
legal regimes, norms, and rules eventually will determine what
sorts of communities would thrive in cyberspace, how information
will diffuse from one country to another, and ultimately how much
and how fully a country can participate in the New Economy.
A good example is the development of the Internet domain
name system. Traditionally, Internet domain names are registered
on a first-come, first-served basis. Under this system, domain
names that are vital to the development of some communities may
be taken by squatters who have no connections with these commu-
nities, yet who are interested to obtain economic benefits through
predatory practices. Although the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization ("WIPO") was reluctant to recommend changes to the
existing registration systems during the Second WIPO Internet Do-
main Name Process, 9 2 it acknowledged the existence of arguments
that "the first-come, first-served nature of domain name registra-
tion systems exploit the digital divide and disadvantage authorities
in countries with less developed infrastructures for the Internet in
establishing their own identity in the [domain name system] .
Moreover, whenever there are rules, there are always questions
of authority. Because cyberspace is regulable, "[c]lassic issues of
politics-who governs, on what terms? who benefits?-are as rele-
vant to cyberspace as to traditionally physical space."' 4 Thus,
whether the global digital divide will be eventually bridged will de-
pend on how the international community resolves these political
190 KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 108, at 217.
191 See LESSIG, CODE, supra note 56. For articles advocating the self-governance of cyber-
space, see, for example, Johnson & Post, supra note 128; David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and
the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L., at http://
www.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/-articles/post.shtml; I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal
Regime for "Cyberspace, "55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 993 (1994); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-
government: Town Hall Democracy or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413
(1997); EdwardJ. Valauskas, Lex Networkia: Understanding the Internet Community, FIRST MON-
DAY, at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4/valauskas/index.html (Oct. 7, 1996).
But see Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199 (1998) (disputing
the need to distinguish between cyberspace and real-space transactions and advocating the
need to ground cyberspace transactions in real-space laws).
192 See WIPO, THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND THE USE OF NAMES IN THE INTERNET
DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM: REPORT OF THE SECOND WIPO INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS
(2001) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT OF SECOND WIPO DOMAIN NAME PROCESS], available at
http://wipo2.wipo.int/process2/report/pdf/report.pdf. For a summary of the Report,
see Peter K. Yu, A Summary of the Final Report of the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process,
GIGALAw.COM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2002/yu-2002-Ol.html (Jan. 2002).
193 FINAL REPORT OF SECOND WIPO DOMAIN NAME PROCESS, supra note 192, 246, at
107.
194 KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 108, at 216.
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issues and whether the stronger, developed countries would impose
rules on the weaker, less developed countries. An egalitarian plat-
form and a predictable, transparent, and non-discriminatory regu-
latory environment therefore is necessary for the development of a
global information society. When devising the regulatory environ-
ment, members of the international community should pay special
attention to the needs and constraints of the less developed coun-
tries, the socially under-privileged, people with disabilities, and se-
nior citizens.
E. Censor Dot Gov' 95
Government censorship has long been the major barrier to
Internet access. A recent survey by Freedom House indicated that
more than nineteen countries thoroughly restrict their citizens' ac-
cess to the Internet.196 Cited examples include cyberdissidents
jailed in China, 97 state-controlled Internet service providers and
firewalls put up by governments in Saudi Arabia,'98 and the re-
quirement by the Russian president that Internet service providers
channel messages through security forces for potential monitor-
ing. 99 By enforcing a strict information control policy, these coun-
tries successfully protect the power of the ruling elites and prevent
citizens from obtaining access to subversive ideas from the outside
world.
Consider the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Long before the
September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the
Taliban government had banned television and the Internet.20 As
195 This subtitle was borrowed from Leonard R. Sussman, CensorDot Gov: The Internet and
Press Freedom 2000 [hereinafter Sussman, Censor Dot Gov], in FREEDOM HOUSE, PRESS
FREEDOM SURVEY 2000 (2000), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2000/
pfsmap2k.pdf.
196 See Country Ratings: Press Freedom Worldwide [hereinafter Country Ratings], in 2001
FREEDOM HOUSE SURVEY, supra note 129, at 11, 41; see also Sussman, Censor Dot Gov, supra
note 195 (exploring whether the Internet will become a censor's web worldwide). Data are
unavailable for 29.5 percent of the 187 countries surveyed. See Sussman, The Internet in
Flux, supra note 129, at 1. For example, Afghanistan, which banned the Internet, was not
rated in the survey. See Country Ratings, supra, at 196.
197 See Sussman, The Internet in Flux, supra note 129, at 2; see also SHANTHI KALATHIL &
TAYLOR C. BOAS, THE INTERNET AND STATE CONTROL IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: CHINA,
CUBA, AND THE COUNTERREVOLUTION (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Infor-
mation Revolution and World Politics Project Working Papers 2001) (demonstrating how
China and Cuba are maintaining control over the Internet's political impact through dif-
ferent combinations of reactive and proactive strategies), available at http://www.ceip.org/
files/pdf/21KalathilBoas.pdf; Peter K. Yu, Barriers to Foreign Investment in the Chinese Internet
Industry, GicALAw.coM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-03.html (Mar.
2001) (discussing the regulation of the Internet industry in China).
198 See Sussman, The Internet in Flux, supra note 129, at 3.
199 See id. at 4.
200 See Arab States Slow in Opening Up to the Internet, supra note 136. For an insightful
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the Taliban foreign minister explained, "[w] e are not against the
Internet, but it is being used to disseminate obscenities, immoral-
ity, and propaganda against Islam."'2 1 As a result of the Taliban
policy, the Afghans were not only devoid of information technol-
ogy and digital opportunities, but were shut out of information
that can help the country progress. Ironically, notwithstanding its
ban on the Internet, the Taliban understood the importance of
digital communication and "maintain[ed] a website promoting
recognition of its regime worldwide.
2°2
Today, overt censorship by the government has become more
and more rare. In lieu of overt censorship, governments may take
on policies that induce self-censorship by the business community.
Indeed, many corporations practice self-censorship to protect their
business interests. For example, in an effort not to offend the Chi-
nese government, Rupert Murdoch eliminated the BBC from his
satellite service, Star Television, after the Chinese government pro-
tested the news service's coverage of Chinese political dissidents.
23
HarperCollins, a publishing house owned by Murdoch, also can-
celled its contract to publish the memoirs of Christopher Patten,
the last governor of Hong Kong.
20 4
Likewise, although Disney insisted on its release of
Kundun2°-a film biography of the Dalai Lama-despite the Chi-
nese government's protests and subsequent "freezing" of its media
projects, 20 6 Disney dissociated itself from the film by eliminating
virtually any reference to the media conglomerate in its advertis-
ing.20 7 To smooth things over with the Chinese government, Dis-
ney also took numerous conciliatory efforts, including the hiring of
super-lobbyist Henry Kissinger, the appointment of special person-
nel to coordinate its Chinese activities, a visit to Beijing by its CEO
discussion of the emergence of Taliban regime of Afghanistan, see generally AHMED
RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA (2000).
201 Arab States Slow in Opening Up to the Internet, supra note 136 (quoting Wakil Ahed
Mutawakil, foreign minister of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan).
202 Country Ratings, supra note 196, at 11.
203 See Richard W. Stevenson, Mondo Murdoch: Networking, Globally and Relentlessly, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 1994, § 4, at 1.
204 See Warren Hoge, Murdoch Halts a Book Critical of China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1998, at
A5. This incident was notably ignored in Murdoch's newspapers and news media. See
MCCHESNEY, supra note 62, at 116; Murdoch Hunt, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998, at 21. Governor
Patten's book, which was subsequently published by Macmillan, was expected to be highly
critical of China. See CHRISTOPHER PATTEN, EAST AND WEST: THE LAST GOVERNOR OF HONG
KONG ON POWER, FREEDOM AND THE FUTURE (1999).
205 KUNDUN (Buena Vista Pictures 1997).
206 SeeJoyce Barnathan et al., Has Disney Become the Forbidden Studio?, Bus. WK., Aug. 4,
1997, at 51; Robert W. Welkos & Maggie Farley, Insulted by Films, Beijing Orders Halt to Studio
Deals, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1997, at Al.
207 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 62, at 115.
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Michael Eisner, and the promise to build a theme park in China.20 8
In light of these efforts, one might wonder whether any profit-max-
imizing studio would ever produce or release another film like
Kundun.2 °9
F. Censor Dot Com
When the digital divide first caught people's attention, it was
focused on the inequalities of technological resources, such as
phone lines, computer hardware, network connections, and infor-
mation technology skills. As time passes, however, policymakers
and scholars have expanded the definition of the digital divide to
cover the disparity of accessible Internet content.
Today, "the [United States]'s most widespread news, commen-
tary, and daily entertainment are controlled by six firms that are
among the world's largest corporations, two of them foreign.
'210
Driven by politico-socio-economic interests, these corporations
may try to decide what people will read, see, and hear (as well as
what people will not).211 In such an arguably oligopolistic environ-
ment, these media giants would unlikely have incentives to com-
pete and innovate. Rather, they might focus on their bottom
line 212 and ignore the interests of the general public.213  Even
208 See id.
209 See id. (arguing that "Disney, and any other firm that is attempting to maximize
profit, will never again produce a film like Kundun concerning China").
210 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 65, at viii. These six firms are General Electric, Viacom, Dis-
ney, Bertelsmann, Time Warner, and News Corp. Bertelsmann is based in Germany, while
Murdoch's News Corp. is based in Australia. Following these firms closely are: Sony, a
Japanese hardware firm; Seagram's, a Canadian liquor firm; and AT&T. See id. at x. Al-
though these media giants are commonly referred to as the "Big Six," the power and influ-
ence of these companies are far more dominant than their name suggests. As Dean
Bagdikian pointed out, these six firms "are intertwined: they own stock in each other, they
cooperate in joint media ventures, and among themselves they divide profits from some of
the most widely viewed programs on television, cable, and movies." Id. at xii. The power
and influence of these corporations may increase further as they ponder similar arrange-
ments following AOL Time Warner's successful merger. See id at xi (arguing that the AOL
Time Warner merger "is likely to force other giant media firms, like Disney, Viacom, and
News Corp, to make similar mergers with Internet and communication giants like
Microsoft, AT&T, and MCI World, affecting commonly known cyber operations like Yahoo,
Amazon.com, and eBay.").
211 See id. at xii (noting that "[n]ews reporting and commentary controlled by main-
stream media companies are the most politically narrow in the democratic world"); id.
(citing a survey showing that mainstream media companies have ignored the political in-
terests and concerns of close to a third of American voters); id. at xxxviii (describing how
German sociologist and writer Hersch Fischler could not get his findings about
Bertelsmann's Nazi past published in Germany due to the conglomerate's influence in the
country); MCCHESNEY, supra note 62, at xv (listing "Thou Shalt Not Cover Big Local Com-
panies and Billionaires Critically" as the Eleventh Commandment in the commercial news
media).
212 See MCCHESNEY, supra note 62, at 15-77 (describing the implications of hypercom-
mercialism in the U.S. media system).
213 One of the casualties of media concentration is the quality of foreign news. See
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worse, to protect their stranglehold of the market, they might ag-
gressively lobby the government to enact legislation that will favor
themselves and oftentimes counter the interests of the general
public.214
Consider the Internet for example. When the medium was
first developed, many believed that the Internet and new commu-
nications technologies will strengthen democracy and increase po-
litical participation. 5 In the district court opinion of Reno v.
ACLU, Judge Stewart Dalzell described the Internet as "the most
participatory form of mass speech yet developed. '216 At that time,
the cyberculture "tended to be slightly more liberal toward equal
rights, less supportive of traditional lifestyles and families, more in-
terested in government and public affairs, with stronger than aver-
age levels of political efficacy. ' 217
BAGDIKIAN, supra note 65, at xxix. As a veteran correspondent lamented, "International
news coverage in most of America's mainstream papers has almost reached the vanishing
point. Today, a foreign story that doesn't involve bombs, natural disasters, or financial
calamity has little chance of entering the American consciousness." Peter Arnett, Goodbye,
World, AM. JOURN. REV., Nov. 1998, at 50. Another casualty is the decline in foreign films in
U.S. motion picture theaters.
In the mid-1970s, foreign films accounted for over 10 percent of the box office
at U.S. theaters. Every decent-sized city had one or more theaters specializing
in foreign films, and Manhattan alone had two dozen such theaters. By the
mid-1980s the percentage of box office accounted for by foreign films was
around 7 percent, and by the late 1990s it is down to under .5 percent. By the
logic of the "give the people what they want" thesis, this development would
reflect the fact that the American people decided that they were no longer
interested in seeing non-U.S. films. But it was nothing like that at all. Instead,
what this reflected was the rise to dominance in the United States of the chain-
owned megaplex movie theaters. With far lower costs, these multiscreen cine-
mas drove nearly all the one-screen theaters out of business, the very theaters
that had specialized in foreign fare. Megaplex chain theaters would only grant
screens to foreign films if the filmmakers were as willing to devote massive
amounts to U.S. marketing as U.S. studios could, something wholly unrealistic
for them to do. As a result foreign films stopped being exhibited and a new
generation has come along with no idea that foreign films even exist.
MCCHESNEY, supra note 62, at 33-34.
214 See BAGDIKJAN, supra note 65, at viii ("The country's largest media giants have
achieved alarming success in writing the media laws and regulations in favor of their own
corporations and against the interests of the general public."); id. at xliii (noting that "no
citizen action group has the money to match the private corporate funds that flood the
American political system").
215 See LAWRENCE K GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING DEMOCRACY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 3 (Penguin Books 1995) (arguing that the Internet and new com-
munications technologies will "increase[e] the people's day-to-day influence on the deci-
sions of state"); CAss SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 168 (2001) ("New technologies create
extraordinary and growing opportunities for exposure to diverse points of view, and in-
deed growing opportunities for shared experiences and substantive discussions of both
policy and principle.").
216 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also Chester &
Larson, supra note 180 (arguing that the Internet may provide a viable platform for diver-
sity and competition).
217 NORRIS, Supra note l, at 201 (citing RICHARD DAVIS & DIANA OWEN, NEW MEDIA AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 167 (1998)); see also MCCHESNEY, supra note 62, at 129 ("As recently as
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However, by the mid-1990s, the Internet became "colonized"
by corporate interests.218 As one commentator put succinctly, "the
pioneering and cooperative spirit of alternative politics characteris-
tic of the chat rooms, bulletin boards, and MUDs found in the uni-
versity community of online users in the early 1990s may have been
overtaken by a more commercially dominant corporate-interest
shopping-mall Web of eBay and Amazon.com today. '2 19 Indeed,
AOL Time Warner currently controls a third of all user time spent
online, and Microsoft and Yahoo increases the total share of the
top three Internet content providers up to an alarming fifty per-
cent or more.2 20 Small wonder commentators cautioned us when
AOL proposed its merger with Time Warner, Inc.: "If you believe
that the Internet is the greatest explosion of free expression and
cultural resources of the past century, what happens when it is mer-
chandised as a mass-market product by the biggest corporations in
history?"
22 1
With increasing deregulation on Capitol Hill and rapid de-
ployment of broadband technologies, the situation may worsen.
Without appropriate and adequate government intervention or in-
dustry self-regulation, the Internet likely may be transformed into
"cable's closed marketplace of subscription, pay-per-view, and pre-
the early 1990s, cyberspace was a largely noncommercial preserve, with notable egalitarian
and almost anarchistic characteristics, chock full of hackers flaming the efforts of those
who dared bring commerce to the Net.").
218 See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 65, at xiii (noting that "the individual's private Internet
space is continually invaded by electronic sales pitches"); MiKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTS:
DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE 15 (Times Books 1998) (expressing nostalgia
for the Internet in the early stage, when "virtual communities promise to restore to Ameri-
cans at the end of the twentieth century what many of us feel was was [sic] lost in the
decades at the beginning of the century-a stable sense of community, of place"); MICHAEL
MARGOLIS & DAVID RESNICK, POLITICS AS USUAL: THE CYBERSPACE "REVOLUTION" (2000) (ar-
guing that politics on the Internet is "politics as usual" conducted mostly by familiar par-
ties, candidates, interest groups, and the news media); see also REPORT OF THE FIRST WIPO
INTERNET DOMAIN NAME PROCESS, supra note 51, 45-49, at 17 (describing the changing
nature of the Internet and how it has become "a vital new medium for an expanding
digital marketplace").
Ironically, the Internet was created by government contractors using public funds. As
Robert McChesney pointed out, "[t]he Internet could have never been produced by the
private sector; not only would the long-term wait for a payoff have been unacceptable but
the open architecture would have made no sense for a capitalist to pursue, since it makes
'ownership' of the Internet and profitability much more difficult." MCCHESNEY, supra note
62, at 129.
219 NORRIS, supra note 1, at 201-02.
220 See Chester & Larson, supra note 180.
221 Rich, supra note 69; see also Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Com-
mons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 297 (1998) (arguing
that "there are good reasons in terms of democratic values to support the development of a
significant component of our information infrastructure that is free of centralized control
by any body, governmental or commercial").
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mium services. ''222 Indeed, there is an increasing concern that me-
dia conglomerates and their affiliates may "run their fast Internet
wires like private toll roads, banning other Internet providers or
diverting them to slow and bumpy traffic lanes. '12 2 3 Under this sce-
nario, the Internet will never reach its full potential.
2 24
When the problem is examined from the supply side, it be-
comes even more complicated. The Internet has a capacity to facil-
itate two-way communications. Yet, many industry players are
building networks that primarily focus on users as consumers,
rather than producers, of content. Thus, although consumers are
able to access information commodities, they do not have an equal
means to produce information.225 A good example is the asymmet-
rical bandwidth access prevalent in most broadband Internet ser-
vices, which allow users to download content with lightning speed,
yet place severe limitation on the speed at which consumers can
upload information to the network. Such asymmetry enables pro-
ducers to use the network capacity to send information to the
users, while constraining the users' ability to serve as content pro-
ducers. 2 26 In the end, the distance between consumers and pro-
222 Chester & Larson, supra note 180.
223 Rich, supra note 69; see also LAWRENCE LESSiG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 161 (2001) [hereinafter LESSiG, FUTURE OF IDEAS] (not-
ing the trend toward control and discrimination as the Internet is moved to broadband
platforms). For discussions of open access issues concerning broadband Internet services,
see id. at 147-176; Steven A. Augustino, The Cable Open Access Debate: The Case for a Wholesale
Market, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 653 (2000); Earl W. Comstock & John W. Butler, Access
Denied: The FCC's Failure to Implement Open Access to Cable as Required by the Communications
Act, 8 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 5 (2000); Mark Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet:
Technical and Economic Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1011
(2000); Barbara S. Esbin & Gary S. Lutzker, Poles, Holes and Cable Open Access: Where the
Global Information Superhighway Meets the Local Right-of-Way, 10 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23
(2001); Harold Feld, Whose Line Is It Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable Open Access, 8
CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 23 (2000); Rosemary C. Harold, Cable Open Access: Exorcising the
Ghosts of "Legacy" Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L. REv. 721 (2001); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open
Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 TUL. L. REV. 87 (2000);
Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable Modems, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 3
(2000); Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broadband Networks: A Case Study
of the AOL/Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 631 (2001); James B. Speta, Handi-
capping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17
YALE J. ON REC. 39 (2000); James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 975 (2000).
224 See Chester & Larson, supra note 180 ("If our only media policy is enthusiastically
pro-consolidation, it is unlikely that this new technology will ever achieve its real potential."
(quoting Mark Cooper, Research Director, Consumer Federation of America)).
225 See Colby, supra note 40, at 126 (criticizing the digital divide debate for its bias toward
"creating consumers of information commodities," as compared to "increasing consumer
access to the means of producing information").
226 See id. at 159 (arguing that asymmetrical broadband access makes access to informa-
tion services "less hospitable to the production of content by users"); see also Lewis, supra
note 122, at GI (describing the discrepancies between speeds for uploading and download-
ing content via broadband Internet services).
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ducers will grow wider,227 and consumers will become "end-users"
in its most literal sense, i.e., "a terminus for network content-the
point where the products of the 'network-of-networks' disappear in
consumption.
221
Traditionally, antitrust laws have been used to break up anti-
competitive alliances and mergers such as today's media giants.2 29
As Eben Moglen wrote, "[f] ifty years ago it was uncontroversial for
the federal government to bring dozens of lawsuits reshaping the
structure of the motion picture industry in order to prevent a few
production studios from also controlling film distribution and ex-
hibition. ' 230  However, as Congress and government agencies in-
creasingly tolerate conglomerates and monopoly and as politicians
increasingly rely on corporate funds to finance their political cam-
paigns, 23 ' antitrust actions have become increasingly, unpopular as
a remedy to media concentration. Without antitrust actions,
policymakers might have to turn to other measures to protect the
interests of the general public.
G. En© losure of the Public Domain
As information becomes increasingly privatized, affordable
public information might become hard to obtain.232 To illustrate
the danger of enclosure of the public domain, this section dis-
cusses the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, and the proposed, yet unadopted
database protection legislation.
In 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Ex-
tension Act,2 33 which extended the copyright term for twenty addi-
227 See Colby, supra note 40, at 131.
228 Id. at 128 n.22; see also id. (arguing that the term "end-user" is "a pejoration of the
netizen").
229 See Robert H. Lande, Antitrust and the Media-II, NATION, May 22, 2000, at 5 (arguing
that antitrust laws were meant to address the type of concentrated power present in the
commercial media); Eben Moglen, Antitrust and American Democracy, NATION, Nov. 30,
1998, at 11 (noting that application of antitrust laws to the corporate media system would
be appropriate if those laws are construed as they were originally drafted and enacted).
280 Moglen, supra note 229, at 11.
231 See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 65, at xlii (noting that the telecommunications industry is
"the fourth largest contributor to political campaigns"); Moglen, supra note 229, at 11
(describing the existing political system as "coiTuptly dependent on 'gifts' from individual
and corporate wealth to elected officials and political parties").
232 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66; see also Hammond, Telecommunications Act,
supra note 47, at 184-85 (arguing that the privatization of information has made travel in
the information superhighway as unaffordable as many vacation excursions).
233 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000). For discussions and criticisms of copyright term extension,
see generally ROBERT L. BARD & LEwis KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION: Duration, term
Extension, the European Union and the Making of Copyright Policy (1999); Michael H. Davis,
Extending Copyright and the Constitution: "Have I Stayed Too Long?", 52 FLA. L. REV. 989
(2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium," 23 CoLUM.-VLA
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tional years.234 To some extent, this extension was expected, as
Congress "has extended the term of subsisting copyrights eleven
times in the past forty years. '235 Nonetheless, the extension re-
ceives noticeable attention as the Internet brings copyright issues
closer to the lives of the general public and as the cyberworld offers
an attractive alternative model for dissemination of information.
As Professor Lawrence Lessig said poignantly in his new book, The
Future of Ideas, if every creative act reduced to a tangible medium of
expression is protected for upward of 150 years, whether or not the
protection benefits the author, the work will fall into "a copyright
black hole, unfree for over a century. '236 Most recently, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case challenging the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act.
23 7
Another piece of legislation that has drawn widespread notori-
ety is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"),2 3 8 which
Congress enacted in the same year as they extended the copyright
J.L. & ARTS 137, 170-75 (1999) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation]; Marci A. Ham-
ilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark Healt of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 655 (1996); Peter A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu
to a Constitutionally-Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 595 (1996); Dennis S. Karjala, The Term of Copyright, in GROWING PAINS: ADAPTING
COPYRIGHT FOR EDUCATION AND SOCIETY (Laura N. Gasaway ed., 1997); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 70-74 (2001);
William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How Publishers Managed to Steal
the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661 (1996); Symposium, The Constitu-
tionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long Is Too Long, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651
(2000);J.H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 625 (1996); Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and
Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315
(2000).
234 See 17 U.S.C. § 304.
235 LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 223, at 197.
236 Id. at 251.
237 On February 19, 2002, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Eldred
v. Reno, in which the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act is
challenged. For a collection of briefs and other legal documents concerning Eldred, see
Openlaw: Eldred v. Ashcroft, at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/.
See also Marci Hamilton, Bringing the People into the Copyright Arena: How the New Awareness of
Copyright Law Issues Can Help in Guarding the Public's Domain, FINDLAW'S WRIT: LEGAL COM-
MENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/-20010329.html (Mar. 29, 2001)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Bringing the People into the Copyright Arena] for a discussion of the
difficulties of the Eldred litigation.
238 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 17 U.S.C.). Professor Jessica Litman criticized the DMCA as follows:
The DMCA is long, internally inconsistent, difficult even for copyright experts
to parse and harder still to explain. Most importantly, it seeks for the first time
to impose liability on ordinary citizens for violation of provisions that they have
no reason to suspect are part of the law, and to make noncommercial and non-
infringing behavior illegal on the theory that that will help to prevent piracy.
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 145 (2001). See generally Ginsburg, Copyright Legisla-
tion, supra note 233, at 137-171 for a comprehensive discussion of the DMCA.
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term. DMCA is problematic on two counts. First, it requires In-
ternet service providers to remove any hosted content that alleg-
edly infringes upon the work of a copyright holder, regardless of
whether the reproduction of materials is permissible under ex-
isting copyright law.23 9 Second, it prohibits the circumvention of
anticopying devices and rights-management systems, thus prevent-
ing people from engaging in actions that traditionally have been
considered fair use.240 Since the enactment of the DMCA, com-
mentators have widely criticized the statute for stifling creativity. 24'
So far, challenge to the constitutionality of the anticircumvention
provision of the DMCA has failed.242
The final piece of legislation that sparked major controversies
concerns protection of nonoriginal databases. Shortly after the Eu-
ropean Union promulgated its Database Directive in 1996,243 many
legislative proposals on database protection surfaced in Con-
239 See 17 U.S.C. § 512.
240 See id. § 1201.
241 Shortly after the United States Copyright Office released its report on the effects of
the DMCA, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, STUDY REQUIRED BY SECTION 104 OF THE DIGITAL MIL-
LENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT (2001), available at http://www.loc.gov/copyright/reports/stud-
ies/-dmca/dmca.study.html, more than fifty intellectual property law scholars expressed
disappointment over the report and urged Congress to conduct its own study. See IP Law
Professors Urge Congress to Do Its Own DMCA Study, WAsH. INTERNET DAILY, Oct. 16, 2001, at
200. The study is required by section 104 of the DMCA.
242 For a recent unsuccessful challenge of the DMCA, see Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court decision that enjoined the
defendant publisher from posting DeCSS program on his website and from knowingly link-
ing the site to any other website on which that program is posted). In July 2001, Russian
cryptographer Dmitry Sklyarov was arrested in the United States after giving a presentation
to a large convention of computer hackers on the software that removed security protec-
tion from Adobe e-books. He became the first person to be charged with violating the
DMCA. After strong protests in the United States, he was released in a deal that "saw him
admit the facts of the case but not any illegal activity." David Frith, A Promotion a Day Keeps
Apple A-weigh, CANBERRA TIMES, Jan. 7, 2002, at A12; see Jennifer Lee, US. Arrests Russian
Cryptographer as Copyright Violator, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2001, at C8 (reporting Sklyarov's ar-
rest); Complaint, U.S. v. Sklyarov (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2001) (No. 5 01 257), available at http:/
/www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/USySklyarov/20010707_Complaint.html.
243 Council Directive 96/9, 1996 OJ. (L 77) 20. For discussions of the EU Database
Directive and recent development concerning U.S. database legislation, see Yochai Ben-
kler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role ofJudicial Review in the Creation and
Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535 (2000) [hereinafter
Benkler, Constitutional Bounds]; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis
Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 151 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law]; Marci A. Hamilton, A Response to Professor Benkler, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 605 (2000); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protec-
tion at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amend-
ment, 17 CARozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47 (1999); J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database
Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14
BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 793 (1999); Peter K. Yu, Evolving Legal Protection for Databases,
GIGALAw.COM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2000/yu-2000-12.html (Dec. 2000); see
also Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property and International Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1294-95 (1998) (discussing the tension between the EU Database Direc-
tive and the TRIPs Agreement).
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gress. 244 Despite this large number of proposals, Congress has yet
to adopt any database legislation. There are various reasons.245 As
notable intellectual property scholars pointed out, sui generis
database protection would confer far broader and stronger exclu-
sive rights on database content than is necessary to provide the
needed incentives for database producers.246 Such protection also
would raise serious constitutional questions under the Commerce
Clause, the Copyright Clause, and the First Amendment. 247 More-
over, sui generis protection may be unnecessary in light of the sig-
nificant protection currently enjoyed by database producers under
state contract and misappropriation laws and nonlegal, technologi-
cal protective devices.248 In fact, many database producers, which
are also database users, would unlikely support any legislation un-
less they are certain that the legislation has struck the right balance
244 Such legislation include, to name a few, Collections of Information Antipiracy Act of
1999, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652,
105th Cong. (1998); Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R. 1858,
106th Cong. (1999); Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996,
H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).
245 See sources cited supra note 243 for criticism of past legislative proposals on database
protection. See also Marci Hamilton, Should U.S. Intellectual Property Rights Change to Fit World
Norms?, FINDLAw's WRIT: LEGAL COMMENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/-
20010524.html (May 24, 2001) (arguing that the United States should not yield easily to
global pressure without considering the strengths of its intellectual property system).
246 By granting database producers a monopoly over their collected data, the legislative
proposals would allow private entities to lock up information that is essential to basic scien-
tific research and future creative endeavors. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 64, at
113-24 (discussing the adverse impact of sui generis database protection on scientific re-
search and education); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 243, at 796-821 (discussing the ad-
verse impact of database protection laws on scientific, technical, and educational users of
factual data and information). The proposals also would create an anti-competitive envi-
ronment that makes it difficult for valued-added products and services to enter the market,
thus making information products more expensive. See Benkler, Constitutional Bounds,
supra note 243, at 562-65 (discussing the anti-competitive nature of database protection
laws); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 64, at 124-30 (discussing how sui generis
database protection would frustrate competition in the market for value-added products
and services).
247 See Benkler, Constitutional Bounds, supra note 243, at 539-57 (discussing the constitu-
tional limits of Congress's power to create exclusive private rights in information); Hamil-
ton, A Response to Professor Benkler, supra note 243, at 619-28 (discussing the constitutional
deficiencies of U.S. database legislation); Pollack, supra note 243, at 50-89 (discussing the
constitutional constraints on database protection); see also Paul J. Heald, The Extraction/
Duplication Dichotomy: Constitutional Line-drawing in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 933,
935 (2001) (arguing that Congress "could rely on the Commerce Clause to grant thin
protection to unoriginal collections of information, but is constitutionally constrained
from prohibiting the extraction and use of facts contained in a compilation, regardless of
whether the compilation is original").
248 SeeJonathan Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate in the 106th Congress,
62 OHIO ST. L.J. 869, 869-70 (2001); Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, supra note 243, at
176; see also eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (recog-
nizing claims of "trespass to chattels" over the unauthorized extraction of information
from an Internet website); NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (prohibiting
copying of "hot news" or time-sensitive materials for competition purposes).
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between the production of databases and the use of collected
information 249
In the past two centuries, the copyright industries have been
very successful in protecting their property and in expanding their
control over creative expressions in new media.250 However, this
dynamic has shifted as the American public becomes increasingly
aware of copyright issues and how those issues would affect the
quality of their lives.25" ' Indeed, in recent years, the public has in-
creasingly embraced arguments advocating the protection of the
public domain.25 2 Perhaps the digital divide may provide just an-
other reason why such protection is badly needed.
H. The Digital Me
2 53
Government, media conglomerates, and the copyright indus-
249 Yu, Evolving Legal Protection for Databases, supra note 243. So far, the database industry
has failed to provide substantial factual information as to how it would be harmed had the
legislative proposal not been adopted. It only succeeded in making generalized claims of
potential foreign competition and piracy in the European markets. See Benkler, Constitu-
tional Bounds, supra note 243, at 591-92; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 64, at 70; see
also Pollack, supra note 243, at 92-93 (noting that the American database industry is boom-
ing). These claims ring hollow when only one, McGraw Hill, out of the three major
database industry stakeholders is an American company. See Benkler, Constitutional Bounds,
supra note 243, at 592. Reed Elsevier is a European Company, and Thompson is a Cana-
dian company.
250 See LITMAN, supra note 238 (describing the success of the copyright industries in lob-
bying for legislation that protects their business interests); SIVA VAiDHYANAT'HAN, CO'V-
RIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS
CREATrv1Ty (2001) (tracing the historical development of copyright laws;Jessica D. Litrman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 862 (1987) (arguing
that the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act reflects "an anomalous legislative pro-
cess designed to force special interest groups to negotiate with one another"); Stewart E.
Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1197 (1996) (arguing that
American copyright protection expands as a result of interest group politics and the need
for the nation's elite to protect the status quo).
251 See Hamilton, Bringing the People into the Copyright Arena, supra note 237 (noting that
the increasing public awareness of copyright issues that has resulted from the Napster,
MP3.com, and Microsoft legal battles might change the dynamics of intellectual property
lawmaking).
252 Examples of recent literature emphasizing the importance of the public domain and
the danger of its disappearance include: LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 223 (lament-
ing how the media and software industries are stifling innovation in the New Economy);
LITMAN, supra note 238 (showing how the increased domination of interest groups in the
lawmaking processes has made copyright law anti-public and incomprehensible); VAIDIIY-
ANATHAN, supra note 250 (describing how the increasing corporate control over the use of
software, digital music, images, films, books and academic materials has steered copyright
law away from its original design to promote creativity and cultural vibrancy); Yochai Ben-
kler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Do-
main, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354 (1999) (advocating the use of Justice Brandeis's conception
that information should be "free as the air to common use" as a conceptual baseline to
limit property rights in information products). For earlier discussions, see David Lange,
Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990).
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tries are not the only censors on the Internet. With the increasing
filtering capabilities of digital tools, we easily could shut ourselves
out of information that challenges our beliefs, worldviews, and
philosophies.
In his recent book, Republic.oM, 25 4 Professor Cass Sunstein dis-
cussed at length the danger of unlimited filtering by new commu-
nications technologies. As he pointed out, "[t]echnology has
greatly increased people's ability to 'filter' what they want to read,
see, and hear. ' 255 With a few "points and clicks," people can design
newspapers and magazines that are specially customized to their
individual tastes and viewpoints. As a result, they "need not come
across topics and views that [they] have not sought out. Without
any difficulty, [they] are able to see exactly what [they] want to see,
no more no less."' 5 6
According to Professor Sunstein, a market dominated by
countless versions of "The Daily Me" would pose danger to democ-
racy and self-government, thus compromising individual free-
dom.2 57  Such a market also would fragmentize society258 and
undermine social stability. 259 Even worse, as people tend to make
choices that do not disturb their existing worldviews,26° the in-
creased group polarization caused by the ability of digital technolo-
gies to customize may lead to extremism and violence.26 1
introduced the term "The Daily Me." NICI-iOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGrrAL 153 (Vintage
Books 1995).
254 SUNSTEIN, supra note 215.
255 Id. at 3.
256 Id&
257 See id. at 192. Contra GROSSMAN, supra note 215, at 3-4 (arguing that new communica-
tions technologies transform the United States into an electronic republic that enables
people to take a more direct role in government than the Framers have intended); NORRIS,
supra note 1, at 19 (arguing that digital politics may level the playing field for transnational
advocacy networks, alternative social movements, protest organizations, and minor par-
ties); Rheingold, supra note 135, at 4 (arguing that new communications technologies "can
help grassroots political organizations, nonprofit groups, and other public interest groups
to gather critical information, organize political action, sway public opinion and guide
policy-making").
258 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 215, at 192; see also Marshall Van Alstyne & Erik Brynjolfsson,
Electronic Communities: Global Village or Cyberbalkans, at http://web.mit.edu/marshall/www/
papers/CyberBalkans.pdf (Sept. 20, 1996) (discussing how information technology has
"the potential to fragment communities by leading people to spend more time on special
interests while screening out less preferred contact").
259 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 215, at 194.
260 See id. at 57 (noting the existence of "a natural human tendency to make choices,
with respect to entertainment and news, that do not disturb our preexisting view of the
world").
261 See id. at 199; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes,
110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) (examining the impact of group polarization on deliberation in a
heterogeneous democratic society). As Sunstein explained, "[A]ll too often, those most in
need of hearing something other than echoes of their own voices are least likely to seek
out alternative views." SUNSTEIN, supra note 215, at 199.
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Despite Sunstein's forceful arguments and numerous support-
ing illustrations, one might wonder why most of us would be so
uncurious, narcissistic, close-minded, and ignorant of our need for
diverse opinions and competing viewpoints. 26 2 One also might
wonder why most of us would not have different interpretations or
draw different conclusions when we see a similar version of "The
Daily Me." After all, as Sunstein illustrated with his example of
Israel's policy of having one broadcast channel, shared experiences
are effective in promoting a democratic exchange of ideas.2 6 3
Nevertheless, despite these queries (as well as other disagree-
ments concerning his belief in the role of government in speech
regulation), Professor Sunstein has alerted us to the danger of un-
limited filtering and customization by new communications tech-
nologies. Because the digital divide concerns the availability of
relevant content, unlimited filtering capabilities of digital technolo-
gies might widen this divide by allowing people to "customize"
themselves out of the content needed to make informed judgment
and rational decisions.
I. The Market of Privacy
In recent years, companies have offered computer equipment,
Internet hookups, and server storage space free of charge in ex-
change for the user's personal and profile information, Web surf-
ing habits, and purchasing preferences, which were subsequently
sold to advertisers, marketers, and demographic researchers.
264
262 Even Professor Sunstein conceded, "[m] ost of us have a great deal of curiosity, and
sometimes we like to see materials that challenge us and that do not merely reinforce our
existing tastes andjudgments. This is demonstrated every day, not least by the truly aston-
ishing growth of sites on the Internet." Id. at 200; see also Gary Chapman, Cyberfunk, WASH.
POST, June 10, 2001, at T4 (criticizing Sunstein's book for being "disconnected from the
real world" and noting that the Internet is "the world's greatest and most amazing source
of surprising information"); Neil Seeman, Democracy.com, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, at http://
www.nationalreview.com/weekend/books/books-seeman06l6Ol.shtml (June 16, 2001)
(criticizing Sunstein's book for "invent[ing] a problem that doesn't exist").
263 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 215, at 92-93 (discussing how Israel's one-channel policy
can be extremely valuable from the democratic point of view").
264 See Maier, supra note 12, 23 (noting that free computers and free Internet access
are provided in exchange for "the consumer's personal and market demographic data;
acceptance of continuous advertising on screen; permission to track, record, and dissemi-
nate to participating advertisers the Internet activity of the consumer; and an agreement
that the consumer will participate in a certain minimum number of hours per month on
the Internet"); see alsOJEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY
IN AMERICA 159-195 (Vintage Books 2001) (discussing privacy issues in cyberspace);
Kathryn Balint, The Cost of'Free'Stuff SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 1, 2000, at 6 (discussing
the costs of having free computers and Internet access); Phillip Robinson, Free Internet Pro-
vider May Carry a Price, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 12, 2000, at 2F (discussing the con-
cerns for privacy invasion by free Internet service providers). In addition to privacy
invasion, users of free Internet service face other problems such as slow connections, re-
peated busy signals, a tendency to lose connections in mid-session, and an annoying display
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For example, Free-PC offered free hardware and software to the
American public, 265 while Juno and NetZero provide free Internet
access to consumers.266
Although these offerings may allow the needy to have the es-
sential tools needed to participate in the digital economy, one
might wonder whether it is ethical for these companies to barter
computers and online access for privacy. To many consumer advo-
cates, these offers are "Faustian bargains" that take advantage of
those who are on the unfortunate side of the digital divide.26 7 In-
of banner ads. Michael A. Hiltzik, Free Internet Providers Are Making Inroads, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2000, at NA1. Since the dot-com crash, fewer companies offer free Internet service as
Internet advertising declined. See Dave Peyton, Internet Service Deals Hard to Find, but Exist,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2001, at 8.
265 See Karen Kaplan, In Giveaway of 10,000 PCs, the Price Is Users'Privacy, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
8, 1999, at Al (reporting privacy concerns for the Free-PC offer); Adrian Peracchio, The
Private Domain / That Free-Computer Offer Is a Faustian Bargain, NEWSDAY, Mar. 11, 1999, at
A50 (criticizing free computer offer as "a Faustian bargain"); Iris Schneider, Free-computer
Offering Has a Hidden Cost, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at 42 (discussing the hidden costs
of the Free-PC offer); Jeffrey Rosen, The Eroded Self N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, at A46 (com-
pared the Free-PC deal to "allowing a camera into your bedroom in exchange for a free
toaster"); see also Maier, supra note 12, 24 (describing Free-PC's services and consumers'
concern that the company might "market this service to only those in demographics that
are likely to purchase from the Internet"). The Free-PC offer ended after eMachines ac-
quired the company five months after it had shipped its first 20,000 computers. See Balint,
supra note 264, at 6; Lisa Guernsey, The End of Free-PC Program Is Windfall for Early Subscribers,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at G3; Saul Hansell, No More Giveaway Computers. Free-PC to Be
Bought by eMachines, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at Cl.
266 In September 2001, NetZero merged with Juno to form United Online. See Press
Release, NetZero and Juno Complete Merger Creating United Online, (Sept. 25, 2001),
available at http://www.irconnect.com/untd/pages/news-releases.shtml?d=20473. One
journalist described NetZero's policy:
NetZero ... requires users to fill out a 40-item questionnaire eliciting personal
data as well as marketing habits and buying predilections. Whenever users log
on, the company tracks their meanderings all over the Web and sells that infor-
mation to advertisers, whose pitches appear in an on-screen window, the "Zero-
Port," that users cannot close as long as they remain connected.
Hiltzik, supra note 264, at NAL. For the privacy statement issued by NetZero, see Netzero,
Inc. Privacy Statement, at http://netzero.net/legal/privacy.html. Ironically, despite its col-
lection of users' personal information, NetZero portrays itself as the "Defender of the Free
World." "In an extensive advertising campaign, Netzero.com portrays its founders as be-
sieged witnesses before a legislative committee, defending basic liberty by protecting every-
one's 'right' to have access to the Internet." SUNSTEIN, supra note 215, at 19. For privacy
concerns regarding Juno, see Suzanne Choney, Juno May Not Charge, but It's No Free Lunch,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRn., Mar. 27, 2001, at 2.
267 See, e.g., Peracchio, supra note 265, at A50; Schneider, supra note 265, at 42 (quoting
Evan Hendricks, a privacy advocate and editor of the newsletter Privacy Times). In addition
to privacy intrusion, some commentators have expressed concern about the high suscepti-
bility of the poor to advertising. As one commentator put it, "[h]istorically, the poor are
the most susceptible to advertising generally, the least able to afford to navigate the perils
of our consumerist culture and the most prone to being misled by dishonest advertising."
Katie Hafner, We're Not All Connected, Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at G1 (quoting Daniel
Ben-Horin, president of CompuMentor, one of the nation's largest providers of technology
assistance services to nonprofit groups and schools).
Andrew Shapiro argued that the market of privacy would create a system of first-and
second-class privacy rights that make the poor even more vulnerable.
The poor would be at a particular disadvantage. As companies are able to
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deed, some commentators are concerned that these bargains
might create problems to which the poor, the socially under-privi-
leged, and the less developed countries have no solutions.2 6 8
Nonetheless, with the increased protection of privacy, through leg-
islation, 269 industry self-regulation, 2 7 and technical rules27 1s-the
chances for exploiting the information have-nots may be greatly
reduced.
charge increasingly higher rates for finer shades of privacy, poorer customers
who can't afford these premiums will be left more exposed simply by dint of
economic disadvantage. Even if the markups are small, a little added privacy
may not seem worth it for those with limited disposable income, especially
since they are already likely to be monitored by the state if they receive welfare
benefits or live in high-crime neighborhoods.
SHAPIRO, supra note 159, at 162-63.
268 Tracy Cohen mentioned this point in this Symposium.
269 The European Union favors the legislative approach. See Council Directive 95/46,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; see also Peter K. Yu, An Introduction of EU Directive on the Protection of
Personal Data, GIGALAw.CoM, at http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/yu-2001-07a.html
(July 2001) (discussing the differences between the European and U.S. approaches to data
protection). See Symposium, Data Protection Law and the European Union's Directive: The
Challengefor the United States, 80 IowA L. REV. 431 (1995), for an excellent symposium on
the EU Privacy Directive.
270 Unlike the European Union, "[t]he United States uses a sectoral approach that relies
on a mix of legislation, regulation, and self-regulation." DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR
OVERVIEW, available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh-overview.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2002); see also Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 461, 471 (2000) (noting that the United States hold "a very different view [from
the European Union] of both privacy and the role of government"); Robert M. Gellman,
Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and
Institutions, 6 SovrwARE LJ. 199 (1993) (explaining why the United States failed to enact
comprehensive privacy legislation); Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age:
The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089
(1969) (examining the challenges facing the development of privacy laws in the United
States); Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IowA L. REV. 497, 507-11 (1995) (arguing that the American society has a "desire
to disperse standards setting").
271 Professors Lawrence Lessig andJoel Reidenberg maintained that technical standards
and default settings will be particularly helpful in protecting privacy in Cyberspace. See,
e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2000) ("Technical rules and default settings establish data pri-
vacy norms."); LEssiG, CODE, supra note 56, at 160 (advocating the need for "a machine-to-
machine protocol for negotiating privacy protections"); see also Lawrence Lessig, Reading
the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LJ. 869, 898 (1996) (discussing the use of technol-
ogy as a tool to regulate behavior and facilitate compliance with legal norms); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY LJ. 911, 929
(1996) ("State governments can and should be involved in the establishment of norms for
network activities, yet state governments cannot and should not attempt to expropriate all
regulatory power from network communities."); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The
Formulation ofInformation Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998)
(arguing that policymakers must "understand, consciously recognize, and encourage" the
set of rules for information flows imposed by technology and communication networks
known as "Lex Informatica"); Joel R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic High-
ways: Merging the Trade and Technical Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 296-301 (1993)
(discussing the use of technology to protect the integrity and interoperability of informa-
tion networks).
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CONCLUSION
The Internet and new communications technologies have
caused profound changes to our society. Whether these technolo-
gies can benefit our community will depend on us (and the policy-
makers we elect). As a media historian put it succinctly, "[e]ach
time a new medium comes along, great hopes are raised. But the
lesson of history is that every new medium provides new opportuni-
ties for selling as well as for education, for monopolists as well as
for democracy, and for abuse as well as for benefit." '272 Thus, it is
important that we ensure that the Internet and new communica-
tions technologies become a tool of empowerment, rather than
one of disenfranchisement. By doing so, we not only will bridge
the digital divide, but also will create digital dividends for those
who traditionally have been the information have-nots.
272 Steve Lohr, The Great Unplugged Masses Confront the Future, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1996,
§ 4, at 1 (quoting Erik Barnouw, professor emeritus at Columbia University and a media
historian); see also GROSSMAN, supra note 215, at 170 (noting that "technology by itself is
inherently neither educational nor frivolous, neither empowering nor debilitating, neither
uplifting nor degrading, neither democratic nor authoritarian, neither informative nor
manipulative"); Hammond, Telecommunications Act, supra note 47, at 201.
Communications technology can be used to expand and equalize access to edu-
cation and electronic political empowerment, or it can be used to disen-
franchise the growing number of Americans who are at risk. It can be used to
provide much needed efficiencies in service delivery and economic develop-
ment to urban and rural communities, or it can be used to bypass and abandon
them.
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